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In order to avoid the exhaustion of critique, this project aims to assemble a positive, 
creative and immanent conception of critique that connects to the world in order to 
transform it, through an examination of the work of Deleuze and Guattari. The 
journey into critique begins with the Kantian project of immanent critique as a call to 
establish the limits of reason. However, according to Deleuze, KantÕs reliance on the 
transcendental subject meant that Kant was both unable to account for the 
constitution of real experience and to take immanence to the limit. The next step of 
the expedition is Nietzsche, as the philosopher who, according to Deleuze, was able 
to complete the project of an immanent critique with the will to power as a principle 
of internal genesis of the real, as opposed to the Kantian external conditioning. 
Additionally, Nietzsche provides a positive and creative conception of critique that 
moves beyond reaction, into the affirmation of an active mode of existence. Moving 
on to an examination of DeleuzeÕs own excursion through the history of philosophy, 
in order to further develop his conception of immanence, through the positioning of 
the univocity of Being. The next stop is Deleuze and GuattariÕs development of an 
immanent account of philosophy and thought, where they forge a connection 
between thought and a given territory. Finalizing the journey by examining KafkaÕs 
literary machine as the most positive and powerful expression of a critique that aims 
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ÔThe main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were 
not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would 
say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? 
What is true for writing and for love relationship is also true for life. The 
game is worthwhile insofar as we donÕt know what will be at the endÕ 
(Foucault 1988b: 9).  
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A Problem Setting Introduction 
!
For my undergraduate dissertation I explored the question ÒIs a Non-normative 
Critique of Liberalism Possible?Ó by looking at the work of Michael Foucault. I 
developed a defence of Foucault against accusations of being normatively confused 
(Fraser 1981), or lacking a Ônormative yardstickÕ (Habermas 1986: 108) in order to 
evaluate life (Taylor 1986: 93). In contrast to notions of critique that aim to establish 
universal norms as principles of evaluation; Foucault develops an immanent 
conception of critique through a historical investigation of the events that have 
brought us to our present, in order to show its contingency and therefore the 
possibilities of going beyond our given situation (Foucault 2007: 113; Foucault 
1988a: 1). As the end of the project was approaching, my inquiry into the work of 
Foucault led me to his relationship to Nietzsche and Deleuze. Unfortunately, I was 
unable to explore these lines of research due to the space and time constraints of an 
undergraduate dissertation. This is where I picked up the project when I started this 
MRes thesis: following the thread of an immanent conception of critique, starting on 
DeleuzeÕs work on Nietzsche. However, there was three questions that I had to deal 
with in order to situate my reading of Deleuze: What is DeleuzeÕs relationship to the 
Kantian critical tradition? Is the concept of critique still relevant today? And what is 
DeleuzeÕs relation to political thought?  
Situating the Project 
Three problems: Kant, Critique, and Politics 
 
The main problematic guiding this thesis is the concept of an immanent critique 
through different works of Gilles Deleuze and his collaborations with Flix Guattari. 
In particular, there are three questions that served as a guide for the inquiry into 
critique in order to situate this project. First, we have the question of DeleuzeÕs 
relationship to Kant and the critical tradition, in response to Alain BadiouÕs (2000) 
claim that Deleuze is a pre-critical thinker in the sense that he Ôdoes not submit to 
the critical injunctions of KantÕ (Badiou 2000: 45). In this respect, against Badiou, this 
project argues DeleuzeÕs relationship to the Kantian critical tradition can be 
understood as a version of post-Kantianism, where Deleuze takes on the Kantian 
project of an immanent critique and takes it to the limit (Bogue 1989; MacKenzie 
2004; Smith 2012). Second we have the question posed by Bruno Latour (2004): Has 
Critique Run out of Steam? This question is particularly relevant given that todayÕs 
radical intellectuals seem to have abandoned the concept of critique (MacKenzie 
2008: forthcoming). For example both Latour (2004) and Graham Harman (2011) 
argue that critique has become exhausted because it either reduces or exaggerates 
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the ontological status of objects; or BadiouÕs claim that the equation of philosophy 
and critique leads to a negative conception of the task of philosophy, instead of 
philosophy as an affirmative discipline (Badiou and !i"ek 2009: 80). Third, we have 
the question how Deleuze can contribute to political theory. Arguing against Peter 
HallwardÕs claim that Ôthe political aspect of Deleuze's philosophy amounts to little 
more than utopian distractionÕ (Hallward 2006: 162). It is worth noting that the 
accusation of depoliticization is not limited to the philosophy of Deleuze, this 
criticism has also been raised against postructuralism in general (Dillet, MacKenzie 
and Porter 2013: 508). These three questions are going to be treated more in detail 
in the following section.  
 
Is Deleuze a Political Thinker? 
 
According to Hallward, DeleuzeÕs equation of being with creativity leads to a 
philosophy of immaterial abstraction that rejects any form of constitutive relation to 
the world and therefore Ôfar from engaging in a description or transformation of the 
world, instead seeks to escape itÕ (Hallward 2006: 5, 7). As Crockett argues, 
although Deleuze is critical of traditional conceptions of relations, this does not 
mean that he reject all types of relations. Particularly, Deleuze criticizes internal 
relations that are based on identity in favour of a conception of relations that are 
external to their own terms (Crockett 2013: 17). However, it is important to 
acknowledge that there are a number of difficulties that have to be confronted by 
those who seek to read Deleuze and Guattari as political thinkers. As Robert Porter 
and Iain MacKenzie point out, although there is large secondary literature on 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs political theory, their status within English speaking political 
theory is still marginal (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 13). This might be explained by 
three reasons: first, as Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn claim, when it comes to 
political philosophy Deleuze and Guattari Ôtook great pains to craft it in such a way 
that it could not easily be reconfigured as a political programme, or policy modelÕ 
(Buchanan and Thoburn 2008: 1). Second, as explained by Paul Patton, Deleuze and 
Guattari did not engage in the central problems of Anglo-American normative 
political theory like the nature of justice, freedom and democracy (Patton 2000: 1). 
Third, Deleuze and Guattari Ôpropose concepts that do not readily map on to even 
the most enduring fictions of Western political thoughtÕ like the idea of the 
autonomous subject or social contract theory (Patton 2000: 2-3). However, despite 
the mentioned difficulties, following the path of Patton, MacKenzie, Porter, 
Buchanan, Thoburn and others, one of the main arguments of this project will be 
that the fact that Deleuze and Guattari do not propose a political project does not 
mean they should not be considered political theorists in the broad sense of 
Ôthinking the nature of the political domainÕ (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 14). As Iain 
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Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn argue, Deleuze and Guattari Ôoffer a rich set of 
insights and, more importantly, conceptual tools for critical intervention in 
contemporary political thought and practiceÕ (Buchanan and Thoburn 2008: 7). 
Particularly, Deleuze and Guattari provide what MacKenzie and Porter describe as a 
two-fold ontology of the real - in terms of the virtual and the actual or the plane of 
immanence and the concept Ð which allows them to provide a dynamic account of 
the political domain (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 64).  
 
This brings us to the question of DeleuzeÕs (and postructuralistÕs) stand on 
philosophical foundations. As MacKenzie explains, postructuralism has been 
erroneously portrayed as Ôa lazy and inconsistent anti-foundationalismÕ for its failure 
to eliminate philosophical foundations despite claiming the contrary (MacKenzie 
1997: 12). However, as Michael Hardt explains, although postructuralism does 
criticize transcendental philosophical foundations, its aim is to replace 
transcendentalism with an immanent conception of foundation (Hardt 1993: xv). In 
Michael Hardt words, Deleuze and postructuralism are Ônot oriented simply toward 
the negation of theoretical foundations, but rather toward the exploration of new 
grounds for philosophical and political inquiryÕ (Hardt 1993: ix). Therefore, as Hardt 
argues, postructuralism contains Ôcritical and constructive powersÕ that can be further 
developed in order to respond to new problems (Hardt 1993: ix).  
 
Has Critique Run Out of Steam? 
 
Bruno LatourÕs persuasive article Has Critique Run Out of Steam? can be understood 
as a call for intellectuals to be critical of the concept of critique. Some of the 
questions raised by Latour include: have we taken the activity of critique too far? 
Have we reached a point where we are subtracting to the reality of scientific objects 
instead of adding to it? What happens when one of the lessons of critique - that 
there is no sure ground - is taken by the worst possible people? Are our own 
weapons being used against us? Are we using old weapons against a new enemy? 
(Latour 2004). Although at times the tone of the article might seem slightly 
exaggerated, and it might be problematic to frame the problem in terms of a sharp 
distinction between us (intellectuals) against others, Latour raises a number of 
legitimate questions, which anyone interested in the concept of critique must think 
about.  
 
In particular, LatourÕs problematizes two common critical gestures. In the first 
gesture, referred as the fairy position, the role of the critic is reduced to showing 
that objects are Ôempty white screens on which is projected the power of society, 
domination, whateverÕ (Latour 2004: 238). In the second gesture, referred as the fact 
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position, the role of the critic is to show how our Ôbehavior is entirely determined by 
the action of powerful causalities coming from objective realityÕ that the rest of the 
people are not aware of (Latour 2004: 239). The problem of these positions is that 
they either weaken or they exaggerate the power of objects, in LatourÕs words: 
Ôobjects are much too strong to be treated as fetishes and much too weak to be 
treated as indisputable causal explanations of some unconscious actionÕ (Latour 
2004: 242). Graham Harman makes a similar criticism of critical theory by arguing 
that the status of the object is either undermined when objects are posited as Ômere 
surface effect of some deeper forceÕ or objects are overmined when they are 
conceived as a Ôuseless superstition in comparison with their more evident qualities 
or relationsÕ (Harman 2011: 6, 13).  
Although this thesis will not address the question of the ontological status of 
objects, it shares Harman and LatourÕs worry about the exhaustion of critique when 
it is reduced to the mentioned critical gestures. As Latour argues, it is important to 
develop a conception of critique where Ôthe critic is not the one who debunks, but 
the one who assemblesÕ (Latour 2004: 246). Additionally, Deleuze identifies three 
more problems of critique. First, in his book on Kafka, Deleuze (and Guattari) argue 
critique looses its power when it is reduced to a simple representation of the world, 
as opposed to connecting with the world in order to transform it (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1986: 48). Secondly, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze criticises Kant 
for reducing critique to the false application of values, instead of questioning the 
value of values (Deleuze 1983). Finally, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that critique becomes exhausted when it is reduced to a perpetual discussion 
between authors working on different problems; or when it is content criticising old 
concepts that do not have the force to deal with our present problems. In Deleuze 
and GuattariÕs words: Ôthose who criticize without creating, those who are content to 
defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to 
return to life, are the plague of philosophyÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 41). 
Therefore, the aim of this project is to develop a conception of critique that is 
immanent, that goes beyond the simple representation of the world and that is 
creative.  
 
Is Deleuze a Critical Thinker? 
 
In The Clamor of Being, Alain Badiou argues ÔDeleuzeÕs philosophy is in no way a 
critical philosophyÕ (Badiou 2000: 19). DeleuzeÕs philosophy, according to Badiou, is 
classical in the sense that it Ôdoes not submit to the critical injunctions of KantÕ 
(Badiou 2000: 45). In opposition to BadiouÕs reading, this thesis will advance a 
reading of Deleuze as a post-Kantian. What does it mean to be a post-Kantian? As 
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MacKenzie explains, post-Kantianism can be understood as bringing Ôto light 
questions that lie dormant or undeveloped within KantÕs philosophy itselfÕ in such a 
way that you Ôtackle Kant from withinÕ (MacKenzie 2004: xxi). This approach is 
consistent with DeleuzeÕs treatment of different figures of the history of philosophy. 
In DeleuzeÕs words his approach involves Ôtaking an author from behind and giving 
him a child that would be his own off-spring, yet monstrousÕ in order to deal with 
new philosophical problems (Deleuze 1995: 6). Although Deleuze does develop pre-
Kantian topics such a return to metaphysics, and he does draw inspiration from pre-
Kantian sources such as Spinoza and Leibniz, he can still be considered a post-
Kantian for the way he deals and reformulates the following Kantian problems. 
Deleuze and Guattari can be considered as post-Kantians in the sense they accept 
Ôthe relationship between critique and indifference bequeathed by KantÕ (MacKenzie 
2004: xxi, 43). As KantÕs revolution in critical thought showed us one of the goals of 
critique must be to overcome indifference, which results from endless criticism 
engendered by both dogmatism and scepticism (MacKenzie 2004: xix). Second, as 
Ronald Bogue argues, one of DeleuzeÕs aims in alliance with Nietzsche was the 
completion of the Kantian critical project in terms of a criticism of Western rationality 
(Bogue 1989: 15). Third, as Smith contends, Deleuze is a post-Kantian in the sense 
he developed MaimonÕs critique of Kant and his demand for a genetic and 
productive principle of difference (Smith 2012: 68). This will be explored more in 
detail in the following chapters when we look at DeleuzeÕs relationship to Kant and 
his attempt to find a minor post-Kantian tradition (Smith 2012: 68). For now we 
cannot overstress the importance of the study of DeleuzeÕs relationship to Kant in 
order to understand DeleuzeÕs project. As MacKenzie maintains, Ôto dismiss or 
downplay the critical dimensions of the thought of Deleuze and Guattari is to 
virtually eradicate the idea that their work constitutes a critical intervention in the 




Reading and writing about Deleuze is in no way an easy task. Throughout this 
project I encountered a great number of methodological difficulties that are not only 
related the discipline of political philosophy but also to DeleuzeÕs thought in 
particular. Although these challenges have been already identified by the secondary 
literature on DeleuzeÕs work, it is important to acknowledge these problems and 
how they guided this project before starting the discussion. The first dilemma I 
encountered was that of which path to follow in terms of DeleuzeÕs influences from 
the history of philosophy. As Jones and Roffe point out ÔDeleuzeÕs thought is one 
which unfolds internal to an examination of the thought of othersÕ (Jones and Roffe 
2009: 3). This is evident in DeleuzeÕs early monographs on individual thinkers such 
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as Nietzsche (1962) or Kant (1963). Additionally, this is also true for DeleuzeÕs later 
work Ôin his own nameÕ and for his collaborations with Felix Guattari. The reason for 
this is that Deleuze has a problematic approach to the history of philosophy that 
involves finding a problem, such as the problem of immanence or the problem of 
difference and repetition, and using different thinkers of the history of philosophy to 
provide an answer. As Deleuze explains in Difference and Repetition, writing 
philosophy involves gathering the arrows of Ôthose which seem to us the finest in 
order to try to send them in other directionsÕ (Deleuze 1994: xv). This means Ôthere is 
no way to grasp the philosophy of Deleuze in itself. It must be approached through 
the many doorways and intersecting paths provided by the multitude of others with 
whom DeleuzeÕs work engagesÕ (Jones and Roffe 2009: 5).  
 
This brings us to the problem of selectivity. As Williams argues there is no right or 
wrong path to follow, just as there is no need to choose a single figure from the 
history of philosophy. DeleuzeÕs philosophy offers multiple openings so Ôthe field 
should be allowed to remain open enough to allow this plurality of interpretations to 
co-exist in productive conversationÕ (Williams 2010: 117). Therefore, instead of 
asking Ôwho is right?Õ a more appropriate question when looking at DeleuzeÕs work is 
Ôwhose line to follow and transform?Õ (Williams 2010: 117). However, this does not 
mean that all interpretations are equally valid; rather it means that validity is 
determined in terms of practical developments or what philosophy can do 
depending on the problem that is being explored (Williams 2010: 117-118). As 
Hardt explains, Deleuze himself followed this method when studying different 
figures of the history of philosophy, his engagement with them was not 
comprehensive and faithful, but selective in order to make his own use of it (Hardt 
2006: xii).  
 
The second difficulty I encountered was the complexity of Deleuzian concepts. As 
Claire Colebrook explains, for Deleuze Ôconcepts are intensive: they do not gather 
together an already existing set of things (extension); they allow for movements and 
connectionÕ (Colebrook 2005: 1). Therefore, one of the main challenges of this 
project was keeping the dynamism of DeleuzeÕs concepts and project, while being 
able to give it order and consistency in an assemblage of the concept of immanent 
critique. As Colebrook explains, an assemblage Ôgives some sort of order or 
consistency to a life which bears a much greater complexity and dynamism, but it 
also enables - from that order - the creation of further and more elaborate 
orderingsÕ (Colebrook 2005: 3). The aim of this project was not to dig deep into 
particular expressions of the problem of critique, nor to provide a synthesis. The 
intention was to remain as true to the notion of immanent critique by assembling, 
making connections, following lines without a pre-established research route or an 
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end point.  
What is an Assemblage? 
 
What does it mean to assemble the concept of critique? Deleuze first introduced the 
term agencement - which is usually translated to assemblage - in A Thousand 
Plateaus. As Wise explains, the most common meaning of the term is Ôputting 
togetherÕ or Ôlaying outÕ (Wise 2011: 91). However, DeleuzeÕs use of the term is not 
as evident as it might seem and some important clarifications have to be made. 
First, it is important to note that for Deleuze and Guattari concepts are always in a 
process of becoming (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). As Paul Patton shows, a good 
example of the dynamism of concepts is the different types of assemblages made 
up of different content presented by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, 
including collective assemblages of enunciation and books. Both concepts are going 
to be explained in detail further on, for now the important point is that the analyses 
of different types of assemblages alter the concept of the assemblage itself. In 
PattonÕs words Ôthose analyses transform and deform the concept of assemblage in 
such a manner that it exemplifies the continuous variation which Deleuze and 
Guattari ascribe to philosophical conceptsÕ (Patton 2000: 42). So it is not the case 
that an assemblage is simply a multiple expression of a single concept, there are 
different types of assemblage that change the concept itself (Roffe 2005: 176). 
Secondly, it is important to highlight the procedural aspect of the term. In WiseÕs 
words Ôit is not the arrangement or organization but the process of arranging, 
organizing, fitting togetherÕ or a Ôbecoming that brings elements togetherÕ (Wise 
2011: 91). Third, an assemblage is a gathering of heterogeneous elements (Wise 
2012: 92). For example in the case of a book as an assemblage, it also includes the 
author and the world so there is no distinction between these three different fields 
of reality (Deleuze 1987: 23). In this sense Deleuze and Guattari argue an 
assemblage is a multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 23). As Roffe clarifies, a 
multiplicity can be understood as an ensemble or Ôa complex structure that does not 
reference a prior unityÕ (Roffe 2005: 176). In other words, the different fragments of 
the multiplicity are not merely parts of a whole: Ôthe assemblage does not constitute 
a part-whole relationÕ (Buchanan 2015: 388). This means an assembling is not about 
arranging predetermined parts of an already existing structure, not about arranging 
completely random parts either (Wise 2011: 91). The reason for this is that there is a 
sense of unity or consistency that comes from assembling together different parts, 
but this unity is only temporary, as you cannot divide the assemblage or add to it 
without changing its nature (Roffe 2005: 177). This in turn represents a move away 
from notions of essence or identity, favouring practice and how the assemblage 
functions and in connection to what it functions (Roffe 2005: 177, Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 4).  
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Structure: Assembling Critique  
 
What is going to be assembled? After the literature review, which is going to 
provide a summary of DeleuzeÕs relation to three important of the critical tradition: 
Kant, Hegel and Marx, and Foucault as another thinker who shares the problem of 
an immanent critique; Chapter one deals with DeleuzeÕs relation to Kant. As we will 
see, Deleuze adopts KantÕs project of an immanent critique but takes it to the limit, 
and in this sense Deleuze can be read as a post-Kantian. While Kant is concerned 
with establishing the conditions of possible experience and setting the limits of 
knowledge, DeleuzeÕs project aims to find the genetic conditions of the real - how 
the given is given (Bergen 2009: 8). In the second chapter, in order to push 
immanence to the limit, Deleuze uses NietzscheÕs concept of genealogy as that of 
an immanent critique, with the will to power as the principle of internal genesis as 
opposed to an external standard of evaluation (Patton 2000: 23). Additionally, 
Nietzsche also helps Deleuze to develop a conception of an active and creative 
critique, instead of critique as a reaction such as in DeleuzeÕs reading of Hegel. 
Chapter three will deal with the question of DeleuzeÕs univocal ontology. Although 
this chapter does not deal directly with the concept of critique, its importance lies in 
the fact that in order to advance an immanent philosophy, Deleuze needs a univocal 
ontology - where being is said on one and the same sense of everything (Deleuze 
1990: 179). However, DeleuzeÕs univocal ontology raises an important question that 
has to be dealt with: is Deleuze a Platonic thinker of the One? (Badiou 2000). In 
order to respond to this challenge we are going to look closely at DeleuzeÕs 
development of the concept of univocity through different thinkers of the history of 
philosophy, starting with Aristotle and ending with Nietzsche.   
 
Chapter four examines Deleuze and GuattariÕs last collaboration: What is 
Philosophy? where they develop an immanent conception of philosophy.  Deleuze 
and Guattari define philosophy as Ôthe art of forming, inventing, and fabricating 
conceptsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2). As we will see, Deleuze and GuattariÕs 
constructivist philosophy represents a radical break from PlatoÕs philosophy as 
contemplation, Descartes and KantÕs philosophy as reflection and HusserlÕs 
philosophy as communication. The problem of these approaches is that they 
confuse the image of what it means to think with thought itself granting the image 
transcendental status (MacKenzie 1997: 9). Deleuze and GuattariÕs conception, on 
the other hand, is an immanent conception of philosophy. Immanence is retained by 
positing philosophy as the creation of concepts alongside an image of thought as 
pure movement Ð retaining the distinction between the image of thought and 
thought itself (MacKenzie 1997: 11). Additionally, thought as pure movement 
maintains immanence through a vitalist ontology where Ômovement is not the image 
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of thought without being also the substance of beingÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
38). In other words, in contrast to Kant who maintained thought and being 
separated, Deleuze aim is to examine the genesis or connection between them 
(Lord 2012: 85). As we will see, the consequence of this is a conception of 
philosophy that is co-extensive with the world itself (MacKenzie 2004: 66). This link 
will become clearer after exploring the role of conceptual personae. These 
mysterious figures allow Deleuze and Guattari to move beyond the distinction 
between the subject and the object, in favour of an impersonal conception of 
thought that is immanent. According to Deleuze and Guattari, thought does not 
originate in a thinking subject: thought is engendered after an encounter forces us 
to think. Additionally, thought can be understood as a movement that connects a 
given territory with the particular conceptual persona that express this movement; 
again creating an internal connection between thought and a given territory 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 86-85). 
 
While chapter four examined how Deleuze and GuattariÕs constructivist philosophy 
forges a connection between philosophy as the creation of concepts and the world; 
chapter five explores the capacity of art to intervene in the world by creating blocs 
of sensations, moving beyond art as the simple representation of the lived 
experience (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). The chapter will centre on Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs book Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, where they show how writing is an 
activity co-extensive with the world itself and it can therefore go beyond the 
individual concern into the political and the social world. It is in this chapter where 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs conception of critique is at its most positive and where its 
power to intervene directly in the world is expressed more clearly. However, before 
turning to Kafka, we are going to examine Deleuze and GuattariÕs A Thousand 
Plateaus, where they argue the main function of language is not communication and 
information but to order our world. Alternatively, if language has the power to order 
our world, language also has the power of disordering and transformation. As 
Robert Porter argues, KafkaÕs work avails to this power (Porter 2009: 6). It is 
important to note Deleuze and Guattari provide a very particular reading of Kafka as 
a social and political thinker, against common psychoanalytical or theological 
interpretations that tend to overemphasise the individualist character of his work. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, KafkaÕs method of writing is political in the 
sense it simultaneously translates everything into assemblages in order to dismantle 
those assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 47). This constitutes a direct 
experimentation with the world in order to transform it, for example by 
defamiliarizing the traditional conception of the law as transcendental in favour of an 
immanent conception of the law (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45-46, Porter 2009: 2, 
6, 45); or by providing a comic exaggeration of the Oedipal figure of the father to 
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the point of absurdity (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 58; Porter 2009: 20). According 
to Deleuze and Guattari, Ôthis method is more intense that any critiqueÕ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986: 48). However, it is important to understand Deleuze and Guattari 
are criticising a particular type of critique: critique as representation - where the role 
of critique is simply to portray social issues such as precarious working conditions. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue Kafka goes one step further than critique as 
representation by directly connecting to the world and transforming it (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1986: 57-58; Porter 2009: 25-27).  
 
Undoubtedly, this project involves a long journey into the assemblage of the 
concept of critique. For this reason, it is worth to emphasise how the concept of 
critique only makes sense after going through the whole assembling process. 
Starting from the more negative expression of the problem of critique through 
DeleuzeÕs critique of Kant; through the detours of developing and deepening an 
immanent account of philosophy, which is necessary for immanent critique but also 
complicates the picture; to the most positive expression of critique in the work of 
Kafka, where we finally go beyond critique as representation into a critique that 
connects to the world.  
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Literature Review: Kant, Hegel, Marx and Foucault 
!
The aim of this literature review is to provide a summary of DeleuzeÕs relationship to 
three important thinkers of the critical tradition: Kant, Hegel and Marx. Moreover, 
Foucault is also included in this list, as he shares DeleuzeÕs project of proving an 




KantÕs critical philosophy consists of three critiques: the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781, 1787), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Critique of Judgement 
(1790). In summary, in the first critique Kant explores the problem of the limits of 
reason; the second critique deals with moral philosophy; and the third critique with 
aesthetics and theology.  KantÕs critique of Pure Reason was a response to the call 
to Ôinstitute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims and dismiss all 
groundless pretensionsÕ (Kant 1961: 9). KantÕs concern was reasonÕs propensity to 
seek application beyond its cognitive context (Rush 2004: 10).  In other words, 
reason is prone to claim knowledge that cannot be established; for example 
knowledge concerning God, freedom and immortality (Adams and Searle 2004: 
417). As Lumsden explains, the Enlightenment had replaced faith, tradition and 
dogmatic authority with reason. However, according to Kant, the Enlightenment had 
just Ôremoved the foundations of belief systemsÕ without grounding or securing its 
own claims.  Therefore the need to make a critical examination of the authority of 
reason by placing reason Ôunder the same kind of critical lens with which the 
Enlightenment had examined everything elseÕ (Lumsden 2013: 26). This critique had 
to be carried out by reason itself (Rush 2004:10) and Ôreason, concepts and norms 
had to be able to ground themselves without appeal to anything beyond their 
human determinationÕ (Lumsden 2013: 27). In the second critique, the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Kant establishes a connection between human freedom and moral 
law, while justifying the need for the existence of God and the immortality of the 
soul by appealing to practical philosophy (Guyer 2007: 4, 20). As opposed to 
theoretical philosophy, where the categories form our experience of the world, 
practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be, creating the possibility for 
the creation of a moral world by following moral law (Rohlf 2016). Finally, in the 
Critique of Judgement, Kant deals with aesthetic judgment on the beautiful and the 
sublime, and teleological judgement - how the appeal to ends affects our 
understanding of nature (Guyer 2007: 4; Ginsborg 2014). However, as Adams and 
Searle explain, the Critique of Judgement Ôhas the potential to severely disturb the 
edifice of KantÕs Critical PhilosophyÕ as established in the Critique of Pure Reason. In 
the third critique, Kant moves away from the examination of determinant judgment 
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Ð which goes from the universal to the particular guided by the category of 
understanding; to the examination of reflective judgment Ð where the particular is 
given and the universal has to be found, giving creation precedence over 
understanding1 (Adams and Searle, 2004: 417).  
 
As it is going to be explored more in detail in the chapter dedicated to Kant, 
Deleuze has a complex relationship with his self-proclaimed ÔenemyÕ Kant (Deleuze 
1995: 6). Firstly, Deleuze admires KantÕs project of a purely immanent critique of 
reason, where illusion arises not from external causes but from the tendency of 
reason to go beyond its own limits (Deleuze 1983: 91). However, according to 
Deleuze, Kant did not take immanence to the limit for two reasons. The first reason 
is KantÕs reliance to the transcendental subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). 
Second, Kant resurrected transcendent Ideas (the Self, the World, and God) as 
postulates of moral law in the second Critique (Smith 2012: 17-18, Deleuze 1994: 
87). Therefore, DeleuzeÕs project can be understood as a reformulation of the 
Kantian project, although in a different way from the major post-Kantian tradition, 
for example by Hegel (Smith 2012: 107). In this sense, DeleuzeÕs Nietzsche and 
Philosophy can be understood as a realization of MaimonÕs critique of Kant, where 
genealogy serves as a genetic and differential principle (Smith 2012: 68). 
Additionally, DeleuzeÕs theory of Ideas can also be understood as a reformulation of 
the Kantian project by pushing it to its immanent conclusion (Smith 2012: 110, 119). 
In this respect Difference and Repetition can be seen as DeleuzeÕs response to 
KantÕs Critique of Pure Reason, where transcendent Ideas are replaced by 
differential, genetic and immanent Ideas (Smith 2012: 96, 110). Anti-Oedipus can be 
read as a response to KantÕs Critique of Practical Reason, presenting a purely 
immanent theory of desire without appeal to the Kantian transcendental moral law 
(Smith 2012: 116, 118). Finally, according to Deleuze, while in the first two critiques 
a dominant faculty regulated the relationship between the other faculties (the faculty 
of understanding dominated in the Critique of Pure reason, and reason dominated 
in the Critique of Practical Reason); in the Critique of Judgment, Kant gives room for 
the possibility of the faculties entering into a free and unregulated relation that 
takes each faculty to their limit and beyond recognition (Deleuze 1984: xi-xii, Smith 
2012: 93). As explained by Smith, Kant argues that the confrontation of the faculty 
of the imagination with the sublime forces imagination to confront its own limit: the 
inability to comprehend the sensations of the sublime. This can be understood as a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 As Beth Lord explains, the reading the Critique of Judgement in opposition to the Critique 
of Pure Reason represents a common trend in Twentieth-century continental philosophy. 
However, as Lord shows, for Deleuze the thread that unites both Critiques is the discovery of 
internal difference Ð the difference of the subject from itself Ð created by the subject thinking 
its own being (Lord 2015: 85, 101; 2012: 82).   
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breach between the demands of reason and imagination, forcing imagination to go 
from what according to the empirical point of view is unimaginable, into that which 
can only be imagined from the transcendental point of view. Deleuze extends this 
possibility to the other faculties in the Kantian project (Smith 2012: 93). This is 
important for DeleuzeÕs project of transcendental empiricism because, in contrast to 
Kant who limits the bounds of knowledge to the empirical realm; Deleuze aims to 
ascend beyond experience into the transcendental realm, in order to grasp how 
experience is constituted (Bergen 2010: 7-8). Whilst Kant posits a sharp distinction 
between the empirical and the transcendental (noumenon and phenomenon), 
Deleuze aims to bridge this distinction. In LordÕs words: ÔDeleuze wants to recover a 
more determinate version of KantÕs noumenon: one that does not have a 
transcendent relation to phenomena. He seeks Òthe noumenon closest to the 




Hegel criticises KantÕs transcendental and moral philosophy for ignoring Ôthe social 
context of moral principles and changing practical conditions for the acquisition of 
knowledgeÕ (Hoy 1994: 152). In response to this, Hegel provides a historicist account 
of truth and knowledge where Ôhistorically situated forms of social rationality 
determine the content of the concepts and the nature of the objects that the 
content is aboutÕ (Rush 2004: 16-17). Furthermore, for Hegel history is a dialectic 
process where Spirit, which is the absolute, strives to Ôattain knowledge of its own 
natureÕ (Hegel 1953: 23). What this means for knowledge is that Hegel initially 
accepts KantÕs distinction between thought and the world. However, in Hegel we 
have a progression from Ôless to more adequate ways to think of the thoughtÐworld 
relationÕ until we reach an absolute standpoint where the distinction disappears2 
(Rush 2004: 17). This is done through a dialectical process, moving from thesis, to 
antithesis, to synthesis; where Ôeach thesis is cancelled, lifted up, and preserved, 
from pure subjectivity to the Òabsolute standpointÓ of spirit as substanceÕ (Adams 
and Searle 2004:  552). Therefore, as Steven Smith explains, the role of critique in 
Hegel can be understood as an Ôinternal or immanent examination of the various 
sources of deception, illusion, and distortion that the mind undergoes in its journey 
to Absolute KnowledgeÕ; and from the social institutions that express these illusions  
(Smith 1987: 99). Deleuze criticises HegelÕs dialectic for relying on a model of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 It is important to note there are interpretations of Hegel that try to refute he was an 
advocate of teleological historical development. For example Robert B. Pippin claim that 
Ôthere is little evidence he understands teleologyÉ as if some eventual end-state drew 
everything toward it and needed to be invoked to explain what happensÕ (Pippin 1999: 196); 
or Terry Pinkard (2017). 
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contradiction and negation for the determination of being, where abstract being is 
determined by negating nothingness in order to differentiate itself from it, leaving 
determination external to being (Smith 2012: 59; Hardt 1993: 2-5). However, it is 
important to note that DeleuzeÕs is not an anti-dialectical thinker; Deleuze aim is to 
develop a new conception of the dialectics based on a principle of difference and 




Marx inverted HegelÕs dialectic by arguing historical and social development is 
imbedded in the material world of human productive activity, as opposed to SpiritÕs 
development (Carver 2010: 47). In MarxÕs own words: ÔThe production of ideas, of 
conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity 
and the material intercourse of men, the language of real lifeÕ (Marx 2004: 614). 
Moving from HegelÕs idealist conception of history into historical materialism, which 
states history proceeds through different but necessary series of modes of 
production, driven by class struggle that will culminate in communism (Carver 2010: 
47-48, Wolff: 2015). However, it is worth noting that this is a more traditional 
reading of Marx that has led to many debates regarding the role of the human 
subject in the transformation of the world against economic deterministic positions 
that tend to reduce the explanation of the social and political realms to the 
economic base. In order to move from these debates, we can extrapolate a more 
nuanced position from MarxÕs eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: ÔThe philosophers 
have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change itÕ (McLellan 
2000: 173). As Wolff explains, in this Thesis Marx distanced himself from both the 
materialist undermining of the subject; and HegelÕs idealism, which acknowledges 
the active role of the subject but reduces it to the contemplation of the world. 
Instead, Marx argues the subject transforms the world through material activity 
(Wolff 2017). MacKenzie and Porter put forward a poststructuralist interpretation of 
thesis eleven where a connection is forged between knowing the world and 
changing it. In MacKenzie and PorterÕs words, Ôknowledge regarding the social and 
political world, in particular, will only emerge in the process of transforming society 
and politicsÕ (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 65). This connection is made through 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs two-sided ontology of the virtual and actual, where the 
actual can be understood as the given state of affairs and the virtual can be 
understood as the intensities or forces that constitute the actual. However, this does 
not mean that the actual is reduced to the virtual, as we can also access the virtual 
realm by changing our world Ôrevealing the forces at work within thingsÕ (MacKenzie 
and Porter 2011: 64). Therefore, there is no separation between the political world 
and the activity of studying it, creating a link between epistemology and critique 
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(MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 2). However it is important to note that this is a non-
normative interpretation of thesis eleven where there is no assumption of changing 
the world for the better (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 36-37). Claiming to change the 
world for the better would imply reliance on a pre-established system of evaluation 





FoucaultÕs relation to the critical tradition is not as straightforward as in the case of 
Kant, Hegel and Marx. As mentioned in the introduction, FoucaultÕs place in the 
critical tradition has been questioned by a number of important intellectuals 
including Habermas (1986), Fraser (1981) and Taylor (1986) who argue there is a 
normative lack in FoucaultÕs work. However, these criticisms are based on the 
presupposition that critique has to be universal (Ashenden and Owen 1999: 12-13), 
which means evaluating FoucaultÕs project in the terms of the critics and not on his 
own terms (Bov 1988: xviii). Foucault work on critique is an interesting example of a 
conception of immanent critique that does not relies on transcendental norms, and 
it is therefore relevant for this project, as both Foucault and Deleuze work can be 
understood as a response to the Kantian immanent critical project. Foucault 
explicitly places himself as part of Kant and the EnlightenmentÕs critical tradition in 
the following way: Ôthe thread that may connects us with the Enlightenment is not 
faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an 
attitudeÉ of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique 
of our historical eraÕ (Foucault 2007: 109). However, this critique involves refusing 
what Foucault calls the blackmail of the Enlightenment where you are either for or 
against the enlightenment and rationality (Foucault 2007: 109-110.) This new form of 
critique involves a transgression. This means that instead of following the Kantian 
question of the limits of knowledge, for Foucault the role of critique is to question 
what is given to us as universal or necessary to find its contingency. In FoucaultÕs 
words, the point is Ôto transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgressionÕ 
(Foucault 2007: 113). The consequence of this is that as opposed to Kant, criticism is 
not Ôpracticed in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a 
historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to 
recognize ourselves as subjectsÕ (Foucault 2007: 113). Therefore, for Foucault 
critique is not transcendental or metaphysical, but archaeological and genealogical. 
Archaeological because it does not aim to identify universal structures of knowledge 
or moral action, rather than to approach discourse as a historical event (Foucault 
2007: 113-114); and genealogical in the sense that it involves Ôthe idea of asking 
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who one is by way of tracing how one has arrived at this pointÕ (May 2006: 63). 
Moreover, according to Foucault genealogy will separate us from the contingency of 
the present, giving us the possibility to transform ourselves (Foucault 2007: 114). To 
summarize: ÔThe critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as 
a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in 
which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis 
of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond themÕ (Foucault 2007: 117). Deleuze shares FoucaultÕs concern of going 
beyond our historical conditions. For example, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and 
Guattari argue ÔWe lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself 
calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet existÕ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 108). However, while for Foucault the critical project is historical, 
DeleuzeÕs project explores the philosophical conditions of critique through a two-




Chapter 1: Deleuze and Kant 
 
ÔYou have to work your way back to those problems which an 
author of genius has posed, all the way back to that which he 
does not say in what he says, in order to extract something that 
still belongs to him, though you also turn it against him. You have 
to be inspired, visited by the geniuses you denounceÕ (Deleuze 
2004: 139). 
 
As already mentioned, Deleuze has a complex relation with Kant. On one side he 
described his book on Kant as Ôa book on an enemyÕ (Deleuze 1995: 6); on the other 
side Deleuze also claimed to be fascinated with Kant (Deleuze 2004: 139). This 
apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that Deleuze sees Kant as Ôone 
of the greatest philosophers of immanenceÕ, placing himself in this Kantian tradition, 
while also arguing that ÔKant was unable to push the thought of immanence to its 
necessary conclusionÕ (Smith 2012b: 21). This chapter will concentrate on DeleuzeÕs 
critique and reformulation of Kant. Starting with an explanation of what is the 
Kantian immanent critique and why, according to Deleuze, Kant failed to take its 
immanent critique to the limit. As we will see, Deleuze argues the main problem of 
the Kantian critical project is that it makes the plane of immanence immanent to the 
subject, therefore reintroducing transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). 
Furthermore, the second problem of Kant is that it relies on a method of external 
conditioning that is unable to account for the production of the real. In opposition 
to this, Deleuze will develop a method of genesis based on a principle of difference 
(Smith 2012: 67).  
 
What is a purely immanent critique? As Smith explains, an immanent critique is Ôa 
critique that does not seek ÒerrorsÓ of reason produced by external causes, but 
rather ÒillusionsÓ that arise from within reason itself by the illegitimate (transcendent) 
uses of the syntheses of consciousnessÕ (Smith 2010: 101). In DeleuzeÕs words: 
ÔKant's genius, in the Critique of Pure Reason, was to conceive of an immanent 
critique. Critique must not be a critique of reason by feeling, by experiencing or by 
any kind of external instance. And what is criticized is no longer external to reason: 
we should not seek, in reason, errors which have come from elsewhere - from body, 
senses or passions - but illusions coming from reason as suchÕ (Deleuze 1983: 91). 
What exactly are these errors internal to reason? As Ross explains, the problem of 
reason is making claims to knowledge that are outside its domain, confusing Ôwhat it 
is possible to think with what is possible to knowÕ (Ross 2005: 137). To be more 
concrete, illusions arise when reason claims knowledge of entities that cannot be 
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empirically established, for example God, the soul and freedom (Adams and Searle 
2004: 417). Therefore, KantÕs critical philosophy constitutes an attempt to Ôinstitute a 
tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims and dismiss all groundless 
pretensionsÕ (Kant 1961: 9).  
 
According to Deleuze, Kant failed to fully realize his critique by making the plane of 
immanence immanent to a transcendental subject and thus reintroducing 
transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). What is the role of the 
transcendental subject in Kant? Kant creates a distinction between the world in itself 
and the world as it appears to us. While we cannot know the world in itself, we are 
able to perceive appearances that are intelligible to us as subjects (Adams and 
Searle 2004: 416). More specifically, the subject makes sense of the world through 
time and space, which are Ôthe medium within which possibility is realizedÕ (Bryant 
2008: 34); and through understanding that Ôschematizes the sensible experience 
according to logical categoriesÕ (Adams and Searle 2004: 416). These categories are 
a priori in the sense that they are not derived from experience, but without them 
experience would be unintelligible to us (Adams and Searle 2004: 416). Therefore, 
the need of a universal subject with predetermined faculties that Ôconstitute the 
organizing structure for sensation and form the condition of possibility for 
experienceÕ (Ross 2005: 138). In opposition to this, for Deleuze immanence cannot 
rely on a subject or an object (Deleuze 1999: 171-172). In DeleuzeÕs words, 
immanence cannot Ôrelate to something that is a unity superior to everything, nor a 
subject that is an act operating the synthesis of thingsÕ (Deleuze 1999: 171). The 
reason for this is that by making immanence immanent to something else you 
reintroduce transcendence (Deleuze 1994: 45). Therefore, for Deleuze, it is not until 
the plane of immanence is actualized that we can talk about a subject and an object 
in which it is actualized (Deleuze 1999: 173).  
 
The second problem with the Kantian subject is that it is conceived as Ôa structure 
consisting of invariant categoriesÕ (Bryant 2008: 17). For Deleuze, the use of invariant 
categories is misleading because reality is always in a constant process of becoming 
so it is impossible to represent it in a fixed or limited way (Williams 2005: 125). 
However, this does not mean that Deleuze is against representation per se; 
DeleuzeÕs point is that behind representation there is always a series of 
unidentifiable processes. This means Ôthere can be no identity without pure 
differences standing in the background as a condition for the illusory appearance of 
a pure, well-determined identityÕ (Williams 2005: 125). So, as explained by Smith 
and Protevi, while for Kant the question is Ôhow can the given be given to a subject?Õ 
for Deleuze, under the influence of Hume, the question is Ôhow is the subject 
constituted within the given?Õ (Smith and Protevi 2015; Deleuze 1991: 8).  
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In Kant the invariant subject becomes the condition for all possible experience as it 
is posited as that which organizes experience (Bryant 2008: 37). KantÕs commitment 
to this subject creates two more problems. First, it creates an opposition between 
concepts and intuition. In this respect, Deleuze is inspired by Solomon MaimonÕs 
argument that Kant had failed to establish both the facts of experience and Ôour 
right to apply concepts to itÕ (Lord 2012: 85). This opposition arises from KantÕs 
reliance on a finite subject with passive receptivity, while conceptual thought is 
active (Bryant 2008: IX, 36). As explained by Bryant, if ÔI can think my concepts at 
will, while I must await my intuitions in sensibility, it is held that the two must form 
entirely different orders of cognitionÕ (Bryant 2008: 36). So if concepts and intuition 
are two different sources of cognition the only possible way to relate them will be by 
an external relation (Bryant 2008: 28; Lord 2012: 85). This means that Kant is unable 
to show the internal connection between the structures of thought and the given 
(Lord 2012: 85). To summarize: ÔSo long as the difference between concepts and 
intuitions is treated as being merely an external difference, we are left without the 
means of explaining how complete determination is arrived at between 
determinable intuitions and determining concepts. Or alternatively, we are left 
without the means of determining how a synthesis of the two is effectedÕ (Bryant 
2008: 27).  
 
The second problem that arises from positing the subject as the condition of all 
possible experience is that the structure of possibility will be illegitimately restricted 
to the subject (Bryant 2008: 36). This in turn will create the following problem: 
ÔWhen the subject and the object, being outside the plane of immanence, are taken 
as universal subject or object in general to which immanence itself is attributed, then 
the transcendental is completely denatured and merely replicates the empirical (as 
in Kant)É (Deleuze 1999: 171). In simple terms, Deleuze is criticizing Kant for tracing 
the transcendental from the empirical realm (Deleuze 1990: 105; Welchman 1999: 
616). How is this problematic? As Bryant identifies, given that KantÕs transcendental 
philosophy aims to account for the conditions of possible experience, and given that 
the only way of attaining knowledge of these conditions is through experience, it 
would seem to make sense that the conditioned (experience) resembles the 
condition (consciousness) (Bryant 2008: 30). So why is the resemblance of the 
transcendental to the empirical problematic? As Bryant explains, the problem for 
Deleuze is not simply a problem of resemblance; the problem is a problem of 
circularity where consciousness refers to experience reproducing its image creating 
a vicious circle (Bryant 2008: 31). In other words, for Kant Ôthe conditions are 
supposed to account for what makes experience possibleÕ (Bryant 2008: 31). 
However, if for Kant conditions are external to that which they condition (Bryant 
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2008: 29), this inevitably leads to thinking of consciousness in reference to 
experience in a way where we claim consciousness is true if we take experience to 
be true (Bryant 2008: 32). So the conditions are supposed to account for the 
possibility of truth within experience, yet the conditions themselves get their 
justification insofar as experience is taken to be trueÕ (Bryant 2008: 32).  
 
Furthermore, as already explained, Kant relies on a priori categories of 
understanding which constitute the structure of possibility. The problem is that by 
relying on these categories, we are incapable of explaining how Ôrealized experience 
adds anything to the conceptÕ (Bryant 2008: 34). In other words, if the possible is 
supposed to resemble the real, while the real resembles the possible we end up 
with a mere reproduction of one after the other. So Ôit becomes impossible to 
determine whether these conditions are indeed conditions of all possible 
experience, or rather retroactive constructions of real, lived, and consequently 
conventional and arbitrary experienceÕ (Bryant 2008: 34). In other words, we end up 
treating the possible as the ground for the real, even when the possible has been 
traced from a Ôcontingent moment in the real and is illicitly universalized to cover all 
experienceÕ (Bryant 2008: 34).  
 
As Smith argues, in order to challenge Kant and avoid being caught in this vicious 
circle of determination where the condition reproduces the image of the 
conditioned, Deleuze following Maimon, will attempt to find the genetic conditions 
of real experience as opposed to the conditions of possible experience. As Bryant 
explains, a genetic method is preferred because it permits us to see how experience 
is generated within time, as opposed to presupposing experience and foreclosing it 
from change (Bryant 2008: 198-199). Furthermore, KantÕs opposition between 
concepts and intuition can only be avoided through the formulation of a principle of 
difference, which in turn constitutes the genetic and productive condition of real 
thought (Smith 2012: 67). So in opposition to Kant, who recognized the difference 
between thought and being but undermined it with the identity of the subject, 
Deleuze uncovers pure, productive internal difference (Lord 2012: 83-84). 
 
Therefore, in opposition to KantÕs transcendental idealism we have DeleuzeÕs 
transcendental empiricism, moving from the simple conditioning of being to 
genesis, to an internal account of determination and difference in itself (Lord 2012: 
88-89).  This project is empirical because under HumeÕs influence, Deleuze argued 
that Ôphilosophy must begin with the immediate given Ð real conscious awareness Ð 
without presupposing any categories, concepts or axiomsÕ (Stagoll 2005: 283). So 
the abstract (for example the subject and the object) will not have any explanatory 
project, but Ômust itself be explainedÕ (Smith and Protevi: 2015). However, the 
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transcendental is still needed to avoid mere empiricism, as Ôreality as it is 
experienced does not reveal the preconditions of experienceÕ (Stagoll 2005: 283). 
So as explained by Welchman: ÔThe transcendental demands a way of thinking that 
is not modelled on the empiricalÉ but rather a way of thinking that subjects the 
limitations, illusions and complacencies of common sense to critique, attempting to 
find the conditions of production for what is usually simply taken as givenÕ 
(Welchman 1999: 616) 
 
According to Deleuze, the conditions of real experience are Ônot logically necessary, 
but contingent upon the nature of experience as it is livedÕ (Stagoll 2005: 283). This 
is because for Deleuze, the condition cannot resemble the conditioned (Welchman, 
1999: 616). So if the empirical realm is individual and personal; the transcendental 
will be pre-individual, non-personal and a-conceptualÕ (Welchman 1999: 617; Smith 
and Protevi, 2015). Additionally, for Deleuze the transcendental must be differential. 
This is because the transcendental is a Ôvirtual field that serves as the genetic or 
productive condition of real experience, and that exists prior to the constitution of 
the subjectÕ or identity (Smith 2009: 34). Here, Deleuze positions the virtual in 
opposition to the possible, where the possible is usually wrongly conceived as 
something that pre-exists the real and is therefore less than it (the real minus 
existence) (Smith, 2009: 35-36); in contrast to this, for Deleuze the virtual is Ônot 
something that lacks reality, but something that enters a process of actualization by 
following the plane that gives its own realityÕ (Deleuze 1999: 173).  
As shown in this chapter, although Deleuze celebrates KantÕs project of giving a 
purely immanent critique of reason; Kant fails to realize this project by making the 
conditions of possible experience dependent on a transcendental subject. This 
leads Kant to the opposition between concepts and intuition, which means Kant is 
unable to give an account of internal determination. In contrast to Kant, DeleuzeÕs 
transcendental empiricism will attempt to find the conditions of real experience by 
formulating a principle of difference, which is able to account for the conditions of 
the production of the real.        
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Chapter 2: Nietzschean Critique  
 
From the Kantian tribunal of reason to a genealogy of values 
 
In the previous chapter we dealt with DeleuzeÕs relation to Kant. As already 
mentioned, Deleuze celebrated KantÕs purely immanent critique of reason: Ôa 
critique that did not seek, within reason, ÒerrorsÓ produced by external causes, but 
rather ÒillusionsÓ that arise internally from within reason itself by the illegitimate 
(transcendent) uses of the syntheses of consciousnessÕ (Smith 2010: 101). At the 
same time, Deleuze argues that Kant failed to realize his project of a purely 
immanent critique by making the plane of immanence immanent to the subject and 
therefore reintroducing transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). 
Consequently, the conditions of possible experience are subordinated to the 
transcendental subject who organizes it, creating problems such as the opposition 
between concepts and experience and the tracing of the transcendental from the 
empirical (Bryant 2008: 36-37). Following MaimonÕs critique of Kant, the way to 
avoid these problems is by articulating a principle of difference, which functions as 
the genetic condition of real experience (how real experience is produced, as 
opposed to the Kantian conditions of possible experience) (Smith 2012: 67-68). This 
brings us to Nietzsche who according to Deleuze satisfied MaimonÕs demands with 
the concept of the will to power as the genetic and differential element of 
production (Deleuze 1983: 51, Smith 2012: 51, 68). Additionally, as we will see, the 
concept of the will to power is connected to NietzscheÕs conception of immanent 
critique as genealogy, where the role of the philosopher is to evaluate the 
relationship of forces that give rise to a phenomenon such as values (Deleuze 1983: 
51). DeleuzeÕs study of Nietzsche then can be understood as part of DeleuzeÕs quest 
for an alternate post-Kantian tradition: moving beyond Fichte, Schelling and Hegel 
by focusing on Maimon, Nietzsche and Bergson (Smith 2012: 107). Additionally, 
while Deleuze uses Kant to formulate the problem of immanence that Kant himself 
did not take to the limit, DeleuzeÕs search for an alternate post-Kantian tradition can 
be seen as an attempt to deal with the problem of immanence positively.  
In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze argues Kant failed to realize his project of an 
immanent critique for two reasons: KantÕs critique failed to be totaly positive. Firstly, 
although Kant understood critique had to be total, in the sense that Ônothing must 
escape itÕ, in practice KantÕs critique was still a Ôconciliatory or respectfulÕ critique 
(Deleuze 1983: 89). The reason for this is that the Kantian critique left values 
untouched. The Kantian critique was directed towards false applications of the 
values such as knowledge, morality and truth and not on the values themselves 
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(Deleuze 1983: 89, 2004: 1, 138). In DeleuzeÕs words: Ôcritique has done nothing 
insofar as it has not been brought to bear on truth itself, on true knowledge, on true 
morality, on true religionÕ (Deleuze 1983: 90). Why is a partial critique problematic 
for Deleuze? As Hardt argues, the failure to a pose critique in terms of values is 
related to DeleuzeÕs critique of transcendental philosophy, where values represent Ôa 
region outside the bounds of the critique that effectively functions as a refuge 
against critical forces, as a limitation on critical powersÕ (Hardt 1993: 29). 
Furthermore, there are two consequences of values being left untouched. First we 
have the flourishing of indifference, when debate becomes exhausted after being 
reduced to claim and counter claim, without challenging the common assumptions 
of both positions (MacKenzie 2004). Second, as Hardt explains, the failure of a total 
critique is related to the failure of instituting a positive critique. The reason for this is 
that in order for a critique to be positive we need a total destruction that clears the 
ground for creation (Hardt 1993: 29).  
 
How do we move from a partial critique into a total critique? As Deleuze explains, 
Kant was incapable of carrying critique to its logical conclusion because he Ôwas 
unable to pose the problem of critique in terms of valueÕ (Deleuze 1983: 1). 
NietzscheÕs overall project on the other hand, was to introduce the concepts of 
sense and value into philosophy (Deleuze 1983: 1). This implied a critical reversal 
where values go from being principles of evaluation - Kant Ôcriticising things in the 
name of established valuesÕ - to values being evaluated themselves (Deleuze 1983: 
1-2). In NietzscheÕs words: the origin of morality Ôconcerned me only for one endÉ 
for me it was the question of the value of moralityÕ (Nietzsche 1994: 6). Nietzsche 
argues values are not abstract and eternal, nor absolute or relative, they have an 
origin in which their own value is determined. This means values can be seen as 
Ôreceptacles to be pierced, statues to be broken open to find what they containÕ 
(Deleuze 1983: 2, 55). What do we find behind values? According to NietzscheÕs 
philosophy of force, all phenomena are symptoms of forces that take hold of them 
(Deleuze 1983: 4, Stagoll 2005: 106). Therefore, Nietzsche replaced the Kantian 
persona of the philosopher as a tribunal judge whose role is to establish the limits of 
reason, with the philosopher as a genealogist whose role is twofold: first to interpret 
the sense of force, and second to evaluate its will to power (Deleuze 1983: xix, 2).  
 
The first instance of genealogy interprets the sense of something, the Ôrelation to 
the force which takes possession of itÕ (Deleuze 1983: 8). In DeleuzeÕs words: Ôwe will 
never find the sense of somethingÉ if we do not know the force which appropriates 
the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in itÕ 
(Deleuze 1983: 3). This can be understood in terms of action and reaction, where a 
dominant force is interpreted as active and a dominated force is interpreted as 
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reactive (Deleuze 1983: 40). However, this is still a limited explanation of NietzscheÕs 
philosophy of force. As Stagoll explains, force cannot be thought in isolation (Stagoll 
2005: 107). While a force can struggle to take possession of an object, the object is 
always already possessed and expresses another force. In DeleuzeÕs words Ôthe 
being of force is plural, it would be absolutely absurd to think about force in the 
singularÕ (Deleuze 1983: 6). NietzscheÕs philosophy of force is therefore better 
understood as Ôthat of a force which is related to another forceÕ (Deleuze 1983: 7). 
Nietzsche calls the principle of force in relation to other forces the will to power, 
moving on from interpretation of the sense of force in terms of action and reaction, 
into evaluation in terms of affirmation and negation as the second aspect of 
genealogy (Deleuze 1983: 8, 91).  
 
However before explaining what the will to power and evaluation are, it is important 
to clarify what the will to power is not, as it has been a widely misinterpreted term. 
As Deleuze elucidates, the will to power is Ônot wanting, coveting, or seeking powerÕ 
(Deleuze 1983: xviii, 145). As we will see, this is merely one conception of the will to 
power - that of the slave - which Deleuze will submit to a critique (Deleuze 1983: 10). 
Additionally, as Bogue explains, the will to power is Ônot a ÔwillÕ in the common 
sense of the word, that is, a conscious agency of decision separable from the actions 
it motivatesÕ (Bogue 1989: 20). More importantly, the will to power should not be 
understood as a personalistic or individualistic reference, the will to power refers 
back only to a component of force (Deleuze 1983: xvii). As Deleuze explains, Ôforce 
is incomplete and undetermined without an inner will attributed to itÕ, that which 
complements force and is internal to it (Deleuze 1983: 49).  
 
The rejection of personalistic references in favor of a pre-subjective force can be 
understood in relation to NietzscheÕs confrontation with Platonic idealism, where 
there is a shift from the platonic question Ôwhat isÉ?Õ to the question Ôwhich one?Õ 
(Hardt 1993: 30-31). What is the difference between the two questions? While the 
answer to the question Ôwhat isÉ?Õ is formulated in terms of a universal essence, 
positing essence as a transcendental space outside the realm of critique; the answer 
to the question Ôwhich one?Õ is given in terms of forces and capabilities that change 
in relation to each other, allowing us to examine the immanent dynamic of being 
and the different perspectives of appraisal (Deleuze 1983: 77, Schrift 2010: 39, 
Hardt 1993: 30). Therefore, as opposed to the Kantian universal transcendental 
subject, in Nietzsche the critical standpoint is not the subject or any form of man but 
the will to power itself, which is always plural (Deleuze 1983: 77, 94) Additionally, 
the will to power affirms the power of chance, as the element that brings different 
forces in relation to each other, so the outcome of the struggle cannot be 
determined in advance (Deleuze 1983: 53, 91). Therefore, the will to power must be 
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understood as an immanent and plastic principle, as opposed to a transcendental 
principle such as in Kant (Deleuze 1983: 93). In DeleuzeÕs words Ôthe will to power is 
not separable from the forces it conditions; it Ôchanges itself with the conditioned 
and determines itself in each case along with what it determinesÕ (Deleuze 1983: 50).  
 
How does the will to power determine the relationship of forces? As Deleuze 
explains the will to power is not force, but Ôthe differential element of forceÕ 
(Deleuze 1983: 7, 197). This means the will to power is the component that 
produces the difference in quantity between different forces in relation to each 
other and their difference in quality. While difference in quantity reveals the quality 
of force as active or reactive (dominant and dominated). The difference in quantity 
itself stems from the differential element of the will to power in terms of the quality 
of affirmation and negation (Deleuze 1983: 50-53). Again, it is important to note that 
we have moved from interpretation of force (action and reaction) into the evaluation 
of the will to power (affirmation and negation). We have two sets of qualities that are 
interrelated to each other but should not be confused. In DeleuzeÕs words: while 
Ôactive and reactive designate the original qualities of forceÉ affirmative and 
negative designate the primordial qualities of the will to powerÕ (Deleuze 1983: 53-
54). Whilst we can say that there is affirmation in every action and negation in every 
reaction, the will to power goes beyond the realm of action and reaction into the 
realm of becoming. In this sense, action and reaction can be seen as means of the 
will to power that affirms and denies. In DeleuzeÕs words: Affirmation is not action 
but the power of becoming active, becoming active personified. Negation is not 
simple reaction but a becoming reactiveÕ (Deleuze 1983: 54).  
 
In other words, affirmation and negation go beyond specific actions into the 
expression of different modes of existence. Affirmative modes of existence are 
referred as high and noble and negative modes of existence are referred as low and 
base. High and noble are used to designate the superiority of active forces, their 
affinity with affirmation (Deleuze 1983: 86) and their tendency to take Ôto the limit of 
what they can do by appropriating and dominatingÕ other forces (Baugh 2005: 116). 
On the contrary, low and base are used to designate the victory of reactive forces 
and their affinity with the negative (Deleuze 1983: 86), how forces are Ôseparated 
from what they can do through a limitation that comes either from external 
dominating forces or from turning against themselvesÕ (Baugh 2005: 116).  
 
This is related to the evaluation of values because different modes of existence give 
rise to different values. To be more precise, Ôat the origin of values is difference, but 
there are two distinct ways of making differences, one affirmative and one negativeÕ 
(Bogue 1989: 16). Affirmative modes of existence are referred as high and noble 
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and are portrayed by the persona of the master; and negative modes of existence 
are referred as low and base and are personified in the slave (Deleuze 1983: 55, 86).  
This distinction between master and slave comes from NietzscheÕs distinction 
between master morality and slave morality in the Genealogy of Morality. On one 
hand, the master goes from the positive premise ÔI am goodÕ to the negative 
conclusion Ôtherefore you are evil.Õ As Deleuze explains, Ôwhat is negative in the 
master is always a secondary and derivative product of his existenceÕ (Deleuze 1983: 
10). The slave, on the other hand, has to go through two negations in order to affirm 
itself: Ôsince you are evil and I am not you, therefore I am goodÕ (Deleuze 2006: x). In 
NietzscheÕs words Ôwhereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ÔyesÕ 
to itself, slave morality says ÔnoÕ on principle to everything that is ÔoutsideÕ, ÔotherÕ, 
Ônon-self Õ: and this ÔnoÕ is its creative deedÕ (Nietzsche 1994: 20).  
NietzscheÕs distinction between slave and master morality is also a critique of 
HegelÕs dialectic. This is related to Kant because as Deleuze explains, Ôthe dialectic 
comes from the original Kantian form of critiqueÕ and its incapability to determine 
the forces that give rise to sense and value (Deleuze 1983: 89, 197). However, it is 
important to note it is the slave who represents the dialectician, not the relationship 
between the master and the slave (Deleuze 1983: 10). As already mentioned, we are 
presented with two ways of making difference (Bogue 1989: 16). The slave 
personifies Ôthe abstract thought of contradictionÉ over the concrete feeling of a 
positive differenceÕ of the master (Deleuze 1983: 10). In order to better understand 
DeleuzeÕs critique it is useful to go back to DeleuzeÕs early work on Bergson3. As 
Hardt explains, DeleuzeÕs Ôreading of Bergson continually retains the attack on 
Hegel as its own critical edgeÕ (Hardt 1993: 1). DeleuzeÕs attack is directed towards 
HegelÕs logic of the determination of being where abstract being is determined by 
negation - being negates nothingness in order to difference itself from it. However, 
the problem of this approach is that determination remains external to being, failing 
to capture the necessity of being. In other words, determination is dependent on an 
ÒotherÓ that negates it, reducing determination to an accident (Hardt 1993: 2-5). 
Furthermore, Deleuze argues that HegelÕs conception of difference is too abstract in 
the sense that it is unable to reach the concreteness of being. The reason for this is 
that an effect cannot contain more reality than its cause (Hardt 1993: 8). How are 
these criticisms related to the personification of the dialectic in slave morality? First, 
the differential relation between the opposite clauses Ôyou are evilÕ and ÔI am goodÕ 
is an external relation mediated by the term ÔthereforeÕ. This implies there is no 
causal necessity for the conclusion; it is merely accidental. Second, the slave cannot 
really affirm ÔI am goodÕ since the effect cannot contain more reality than the cause. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For other accounts on the relationship of Deleuze and Bergson, see: Eric Alliez (1998), 
Giovanna Borradori (1999) and Craig Lundy (2017)  
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This can be understood in opposition to the master who starts from the positive 
statement ÔI am goodÕ and the term ÔthereforeÕ will mark an internal movement from 
the cause to the effect Ôyou are evilÕ (Hardt 1993: 34). 
 
DeleuzeÕs reading of Bergson in confrontation with Hegel, serves as the foundation 
for DeleuzeÕs attack on the logic of the dialectic expressed in the persona of the 
slave. NietzscheÕs contribution to this attack is the question of will (Hardt 1993: 33-
34). As Hardt explains, from a Nietzschean perspective, the slaveÕs statement Ôyou 
are evilÕ is a negative evaluation. From the slaveÕs perspective Ôthe evil one is the 
one who actsÉ and the one who is good is now the one who holds himself back 
from actingÕ (Deleuze 1983: 121). According to Deleuze, this evaluation is based on 
the slaveÕs conception of power as representation, where power is conceived as an 
object of recognition, and a separation is introduced between force and action 
(Deleuze 1983: 10, 23). This means power, for the slave, is an external capacity; 
while for the master power is an internal manifestation of force (Deleuze 1983: 34-
35). As Hardt explains, these two conceptions of power are related to the problem 
of two conceptions of critique. While the masterÕs conception of power shows a 
destructive inner force that is carried to its logical conclusion, creating a complete 
rupture; the slaveÕs conception of power is only able to carry a partial destruction as 
power is restrained or separated from what it can do, preserving the enemy (Hardt 
1993: 41-43, 52).   
 
So far we have looked at how critique determines the genealogy of values in terms 
of their nobility or baseness, based on the typology of forces and the doctrine of the 
will to power (Deleuze 1983: 87). Additionally, we have showed how the distinction 
between the noble and the base corresponds to two conceptions of power linked to 
two conceptions of critique. However, we still have to establish why affirmation is 
better than negation and how destruction is linked to creation. In order to do so we 
have to turn to NietzscheÕs doctrine of the eternal return. We can start with some 
background, as Williams explains, DeleuzeÕs reading of the eternal return can be 
understood as part of DeleuzeÕs wider project to redefine the conception of 
difference through a critique of the main figures in the history of philosophy, 
including Plato and Kant (Williams 2003: 79). According to Deleuze, PlatoÕs project 
was guided by the motivation to find a way to differentiate between true and false 
claims in Athenian democracy (Smith 2012: 5-6). In DeleuzeÕs words: Ôanyone can lay 
claim to anything in Athenian democracyÉ if each citizen lays claim to something, 
then we need to be able to judge the validity of claimsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
9). As Smith explains, PlatoÕs solution was the concept of the idea as something 
pure, which serves as the foundation from which you can judge legitimate claims 
and counterfeits, depending on the claimant degree of participation in the pure 
! 33 
idea through contemplation (Smith 2012: 7-9). In Deleuze words: Ôuniversals of 
contemplation are supposed to gauge the respective value of rival opinions so as to 
raise them to the level of knowledgeÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 74). However, the 
problem for Plato is that he ends up subjecting immanence to the transcendent Idea 
(Smith 2012: 9). In opposition to this, Kantian Philosophy can be understood as an 
attempt to overturn Platonism (Ross 2005: 208). As already mentioned, KantÕs first 
Critique (1781, 1787) denounced the illegitimate status of transcendent Ideas. 
However, Kant resurrected transcendent ideas as the postulates of moral law in the 
second Critique (1788), failing to take immanence to the limit (Smith 2012: 17-18). 
For this reason, as Williams explains, ÔDeleuze allies this reversal of Platonism not to 
anything found in Kant, but rather to Nietzsche's model of eternal returnÕ (Williams 
2012: 50).  
 
As we did with the will to power, we can start by explaining what the eternal return 
is not. As Elizabeth Grosz and James Williams note, DeleuzeÕs interpretation of 
NietzscheÕs conception of time and the eternal return should not be understood as 
cyclical or as a return to the same or similar (Grosz 2004: 150, Williams 2011: 116). In 
WilliamÕs words, DeleuzeÕs reading of the eternal return Ôstands in direct opposition 
to any notion of eternal return as rebirth, reincarnation, identical cycles, 
reminiscence of the same events, and the repetition of events, ideas or even 
patternsÕ (Williams 2011: 116). In opposition to this, Deleuze argues it is difference 
what returns. In Deleuze words: ÔIt is not the 'same' or the 'one' which comes back in 
the eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and 
to that which differsÕ (Deleuze 1983: 46).  
If the will to power is the principle of the differential relation of forces, the eternal 
return is the expression of this principle, that which affirms the difference (Deleuze 
1983: 49; Bogue 1989: 30). The eternal return ensures the return of active forces 
instead of reactive. In DeleuzeÕs words the Ôeternal return will not let reactive forces 
subsistÕ (Deleuze 1983: 86). Therefore, the eternal return can be understood as the 
principle of selection of affirmative forces over the negative. There are two moments 
of selection, firstly the selection of willing by thought, Ôwhatever you will, will it in 
such a way that you also will its eternal returnÕ (Deleuze 1983: 69). This ensures the 
removal of half-willing or that which can only be willed once (Deleuze 1983: xvii, 69). 
However as Bogue explains, the first selection is not enough as it is still possible to 
will negativity (Bogue 1989: 31). So we need a second selection that is different from 
the first one, this is the selection of becoming by being. Deleuze calls this selection 
the being of becoming (Deleuze 1983: 71). In DeleuzeÕs words Ôreturn is the being of 
becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becomingÕ (Deleuze 1983: 24). 
However, one question still has to be answered: how does the being of becoming 
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ensure the return of only the active and affirmation and not becoming-reactive? 
According to Deleuze Ôonly becoming-active has beingÕ (Deleuze 1983: 71). In 
opposition to the negative and the same, which are the opposite of becoming 
(Deleuze 1983: xvii- xviii). Additionally as Bogue explains, active forces are 
connected to becoming because Ôactive forces, in going to the limit of their 
capabilities, transcend all constraints, including those of their own identity. Active 
forces impose forms on other forces, but they also change form themselvesÕ (Bogue 
1989: 31). In other words, the eternal return cannot create something without 
changing its own nature. Reactive forces are taken to the limit by the negation of 
negation, which leads to the active-destruction of reactive forces, which turn against 
themselves by becoming-active. Therefore we move from the first moment of 
selection where the thought of the eternal return removes from willing everything 
that is external to it into a second selection of being which is also the most creative 
and affirmative moment of the eternal return (Deleuze 1983: 69-71).   
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Chapter 3: Is Deleuze a Thinker of the One? 
 
As shown in the previous two chapters, Deleuze is inspired by the Kantian project of 
an immanent critique, a project that according to Deleuze, Kant was unable to 
complete. Subsequently, what Deleuze finds in Nietzsche is the competition of the 
Kantian project of an immanent critique, through the concept of genealogy as a 
method that establishes the origin of values such as knowledge and morality 
through the differential modes of existence they express (Smith 2012: 149; Deleuze 
1983: 3). However, as explained by Bergen, in order to give immanence its right we 
need a univocal conception of Being, where Being is said in one and the same sense 
of all beings (Bergen 2009: 11). This chapter will examine DeleuzeÕs development of 
a univocal ontology through different thinkers from the history of philosophy, 
starting from Aristotle and ending the journey with Nietzsche.  As we will see, the 
problem of univocity raises some questions that challenge DeleuzeÕs philosophy. In 
particular we are going to look at BadiouÕs claim that DeleuzeÕs univocal ontology 
leads to a renewed Platonism of the One (Badiou 2000: 25).  
 
According to Badiou, although DeleuzeÕs project appears to be driven by the 
motivation to move beyond the opposition between the One and the multiple, in 
reality ÔDeleuzeÕs fundamental problem is most certainly not to liberate the multiple 
but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the OneÕ (Badiou 2000: 9-10). The 
reason for this is DeleuzeÕs univocal ontology where Ôbeing is said in a single and 
same senseÉ of all its formsÕ (Badiou 2000: 24). The great contribution of BadiouÕs 
reading of Deleuze is its standing against the image of Deleuze Ôas an advocate for 
an unrestrained realization of desiresÕ (Badiou 2000: 8). Additionally, as MacKenzie 
explains, Badiou reminds us of the need to disassociate DeleuzeÕs work from the 
postmodernist slogan of Ôphilosophy without foundationsÕ (MacKenzie 2004: 43).  
However, as Crockett identifies, the problem is that ÔBadiou confuses One-ness with 
univocity, which are strictly speaking incompatibleÕ (Crockett 2013: 19). Nathan 
Widder argues the same by saying ÔBadiouÕs entire critique rests upon an erroneous 
conflation of the univocity of being with a Platonist conception of the OneÕ (Widder 
2001: 438). In order to show why the univocity of being is incompatible with the One 
three questions have to be answered: What is the problem of univocity about? Why 
was Deleuze interested in this debate? What is the history of the problem of 
univocity? 
 
What is the problem of univocity about? The doctrine of univocity was an 
ontological theory that was developed by Duns Scotus in the thirteenth century. 
Scotus was contributing to the ontological debate surrounding the nature of Being: 
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ÔBeing is said of beings, but in what sense? (Smith 2001: 168). There are three 
different answers to this question. One, Being is univocal when it is said in one and 
the same sense of everything (Smith 2001: 169). Second, in opposition to univocity, 
Being is equivocal when it is said in several senses with no common measure 
between them. Third, the middle ground position is analogy, Being is analogical 
when it is said in different senses but there is Ôa common measure to the forms of 
BeingÕ (Smith 2001: 169; Widder 2009: 32).  
 
Why was Deleuze interested in this medieval debate? As Smith explains, Heidegger 
reintroduced the question of ontology into modern philosophy by posing the 
problem of the difference between Being and beings or how is Being distributed 
among beings (Smith 2001: 169). As Deleuze mentions in Difference and Repetition, 
Heidegger Ôfollows Duns Scotus and gives renewed splendor to the Univocity of 
being.Õ However, according to Deleuze, Heidegger was unable to Ôeffectuate the 
conversion after which univocal Being belongs only to differenceÕ (Deleuze 1994: 
66). This is one of the central problems that Deleuze takes in Difference and 
Repetition, where Deleuze aims to find a way to think difference in itself, without 
reducing it to identity and representation (Deleuze 1994: xix). In order to do this, 
Deleuze needs a univocal conception of being. As Foucault puts it: Ôthe univocity of 
being, its singleness expression, is paradoxically the principal condition that permits 
difference to escape the domination of identityÕ (Foucault 2000: 364). This will 
become clearer as we go through a brief history of the concept of univocity. 
Contrary to Badiou, what this chapter aims to show is that the problem of univocity 
has always been about difference, not about the One. In WidderÕs words: Ôunivocity 
is hardly concerned with establishing a unity among differences, but rather with 
linking differences through their differenceÕ (Widder 2001: 239). 
Following Widder, the problem of univocity can be approached in the context of 
Aristotle and his interpretations in medieval theology (Widder 2001: 439). Aristotle 
criticized PlatoÕs use of transcendental forms in order to maintain individual 
identities (Widder 2009: 28). In contrast to this, AristotleÕs project was to look at how 
difference functions to define identities within larger indeterminate genera. 
However, this approach remains insufficient to determine difference, for two 
reasons. First, individual difference prevents it from being reduced to a higher 
category. This means a category can tell us what is common among its members but 
not what makes them different. Second, although Being applies to all beings, there 
is no category that can unify or encompass all the categories of being (Widder 2001: 
440; Roffe 2012: 12). In other words, Being cannot be the highest set (Widder 2001: 
441). This is due to the fact that being is predicated both on identity and differenceÕ 
(Widder 2009: 30). However, for Aristotle this does not mean that Being is 
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equivocal. Even when there is no common identity that can be reduced to one 
category being still Ôimplies a relation or connection across differences.Õ However, 
Aristotle did not develop what this connection means (Widder 2009: 31).  
 
Christian theology introduced a third problem concerning the relation between God 
and the world. The Christian God was derived from the Platonic ÔGoodÕ - which is 
transcendent to Being (Smith 2001: 170). The problem is that if God is both the 
creator of the world and what transcends the world, this means there is a radical 
difference between God and his creation. This difference impedes the possibility of 
having access to a positive knowledge of God. Plato could not provide an answer to 
the issue of knowledge of God because his own philosophy was affected by this 
problem. For Plato to know is to see clearly and the Good is the source of 
illumination. However, this means the good remains opaque because it cannot be 
both the source of illumination and be illuminated at the same time. Augustine 
could not provide a solution to this problem either. Therefore, the challenge for 
Christian theology was Ôto establish a relation of the divine to the world that 
maintains their irreducibility and disjunctionÕ and the answer was drawn from 
Aristotle. This shows that even though univocity was employed by a Platonist-
theology trying to relate the One to the many, it was not a Platonist doctrine 
(Widder 2001: 441; 2009: 31-32). 
The next thinker we are going to look at is Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas chose an 
analogical conception of being, inspired by Aristotle, where being can be said in 
different senses which are proportionate to one another in terms of a common 
substance of being. This means the created world can derive from God, without 
being in the same sense than God. For example, God can be said to be wise in a 
primary sense and his creations can be wise in a subsidiary sense. Additionally, 
analogy also allows for a unidirectional resemblance between God and the world, 
where the world resembles God, but God does not resemble the world. This 
maintains the hierarchical relation between God and his creatures and allows the 
creatures to at least gain an incomplete knowledge of God (Widder 2001: 442-443; 
2009: 32-33).  
The problem with analogy is that it fails to account for the diversity of individuals 
within a given category, Ôit cannot say what constitutes their individualityÕ (Deleuze 
1994: 38). The reason for this is that individuating differences are not a matter of 
proportion. Widder makes this clear in the following example: Ôwhat makes Socrates 
this particular man is not somehow analogous to what makes Plato a different 
particular man, nor does it make him more or less of a man than Plato.Õ Therefore, 
under analogy difference is inevitably reduced to an accidental factor (Widder 2009: 
33). Additionally, analogy does not get rid of the problem of the categories of being 
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that we mentioned when discussing Aristotle. The difference of an individual cannot 
be found in the general category it belongs to (Deleuze 1994: 38). As Williams 
explains, the problem of the categories is that by allowing different ways of the 
expression of being, they create a distribution of being that divides it into different 
pre-established categories (Deleuze calls this a sedentary distribution). However, 
Ôany fixed definition of categories of existence cannot account for the way in which 
things evolve and have evolved outside these categoriesÕ (Williams 2003: 65-66). 
This is why Foucault argues Ôthe most tenacious subjectivation of difference is 
undoubtedly that maintained by categoriesÕ (Foucault 2000: 359).  
Given analogy is still a deficient solution to the problem of difference the only 
solution left is univocity. Univocity provides an alternative distribution of difference 
beyond logic of proportionality between a transcendent God and its derivative 
world (Widder 2001: 443). Furthermore, a univocal conception of being gets rid of 
the categories of being by expressing being in a single sense. This in turns allows a 
nomadic distribution of being where Ôall things distribute themselves and are only 
answerable to themselves in overcoming their internal limits and the way they 
become fixedÕ (Williams 2003: 66). Deleuze wants to show that individuating 
differences precede identity and in order to do so he needs a principle of 
individuation that is Ôno less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of 
constituting them temporarilyÕ (Deleuze 1994: 38). 
The first moment in the history of the construction of the univocity of being is 
represented by Duns Scotus (Deleuze 1994: 39). In DeleuzeÕs words: Ôthere has only 
ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. There has only ever been 
one ontology, that of Duns Scotus, which gave being a single voiceÕ (Deleuze 1994: 
35). Scotus was able to posit the univocity of being by making being neutral. This 
means that being is indifferent to the distinction between for example an infinite 
God and finite beings (Deleuze 1994: 39). Additionally, Scotus showed being can 
possess different attributes and these attributes can vary without losing the unity of 
being (Williams 2003: 67) - positing a relation between univocal being and 
difference in itself (Deleuze 1994: 40). However the problem of Scotus is that he 
imposes a limit on univocity. As Roffe explains, for Scotus particular beings 
(haecceities) exceed univocity and therefore they cannot be explained by a univocal 
ontology (Roffe 2012: 12). As Widder summarizes: Ôwhile ScotusÕs univocity 
establishes a relation between finite and infinite substances that otherwise share 
nothing in common, it is not applied to the third form of heterogeneous difference Ð 
individual differenceÕ (Widder 2001: 445).  
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Spinoza represents the second moment of the history of univocity 4 . As Smith 
clarifies, SpinozaÕs problem in Ethics was Ôthe problem of ontological difference in 
terms of the difference between infinite substance (Being) and finite modes (beings)Õ 
(Smith 2001: 170). SpinozaÕs achievement was to extend the univocity of being to 
the modes (Williams 2003: 67). In DeleuzeÕs words: ÔBeing itself is said in a single 
unique sense of substance and the modes, even though the modes and substance 
do not have the same sense or do not have that being in the same mannerÕ (Deleuze 
1994: 40). Additionally, Spinoza also postulated the univocity of the attributes - 
according to Spinoza we can only know two of GodÕs attributes: thought and 
extension (Smith 2001: 171). The attributes constitute both the essence of God and 
the essence of beings, even though God and beings do not have the same essence 
(Deleuze 1994: 40; 1988: 92). For example, bodies have an extension in the same 
way that a divine substance does (Deleuze 1988: 52). As Smith points out, this is a 
radical answer to the question of the relationship between God and its creatures, as 
the univocity of the attributes necessarily implies the rejection of transcendence 
(Smith 2001: 171). Finally Spinoza postulated the univocity of the cause, which 
means ÔGod is the cause of all things in the same sense that he is the cause of 
himselfÕ (Deleuze 1988: 53). As Smith explains, if being is univocal this means being 
is Ôequally and immediately present in all beings, without mediation or intermediary. 
There is no distant cause, no Ôchain of BeingÕ, no hierarchyÉÕ This is important 
because as Smith argues, a univocal ontology is incompatible with a philosophy of 
the One where Ôbeing is a gift or donation of the One.Õ This kind of philosophy is 
more compatible with an emanative causality where the One Ôremains within itself in 
order to produceÕ but the product comes out of it (Smith, 2001: 173-174). As Smith 
points out, when Badiou claims the ÔOne endangers, in an immanent manner, a 
procession of beings, whose univocal sense it distributesÕ (Badiou 2000: 26) he 
seems to confuse univocity with an emanative ontology (Smith 2001: 181). In other 
words, Badiou is claiming being originates in the One and it is then distributed to 
beings. This description is compatible with emanation, which De Beistegui defines 
as an ontology where the One Ôgives being to all beingsÕ, not with a univocal 
ontology that rejects granting a hierarchical position to the One (De Beistegui 2010: 
33).  
Going back to Spinoza, his contribution was to make univocal being the object of 
pure affirmation (as opposed to Scotus where being was neutral). In DeleuzeÕs 
words: ÔWith Spinoza, univocal being ceases to be neutralised and becomes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 It is important to note that neither Spinoza nor Nietzsche (who represents the third moment 
of univocity) use the term univocity. As explained by Smith, what Deleuze is doing is Ôusing a 
ÔforeignÕ concept, not explicitly formulated by the thinkers at hand, to bring out aspects of 
their thought that might otherwise remain obscureÕ (Smith 2001: 170) 
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expressive; it becomes a truly expressive and affirmative proposition.Õ Being 
becomes affirmative because substance is expressed by the modes according to 
their degree of power, which is the capacity to maintain and affirm existence. 
However, the problem of Spinoza is that he maintained a distinction between 
substance and its modes, giving substance primacy over the modes. In DeleuzeÕs 
words: Spinoza's substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes 
are dependent on substanceÕ (Deleuze 1994: 40; 1988: 99). What Deleuze needed 
was Ôa kind Spinozism minus substanceÕ (Smith 2001: 175) so univocity could be 
pushed to its limit. 
Nietzsche represents the third moment of the history of univocity. According to 
Deleuze, in order for being to be purely univocal Ôsubstance must itself be said of 
the modes and only of the modesÕ. This condition can only be met by a categorical 
reversal that affirms the primacy of becoming over being and difference over 
identity, so being and identity are only secondary (Deleuze 1994: 40). As Widder 
explains, Deleuze finds this in NietzscheÕs ontology of constitutive forces and the 
principle of the eternal return. For Nietzsche, a thing is a product of different forces 
that take hold to it (Widder 2001: 446-447). As Deleuze elucidates in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, there is a differential relationship between forces, which are always 
confronting one another. This is the principle of the will to power, which expresses 
the quantitative and qualitative relations of forces. The eternal return is a principle of 
selection of forces where Ôonly that which becomes in the fullest sense of the word 
can return, is fit to return. Only action and affirmation return: becoming has being 
and only becoming has beingÕ (Deleuze 1983: xvii). Therefore in the eternal return it 
is only difference that returns, no identity or the same (Deleuze 1983: xvi). The Will 
to power can be understood as the mobile individuating factors and the eternal 
return is what is common of this metamorphoses. In this sense the eternal return 
marks the realization of univocity (Deleuze 1994: 41). However Widder explains, this 
commonness of the return should not be confused with a Platonic One. It should be 
understood as a disjoining that escapes the distinction between the One and the 
Many (Widder 2001: 447). Roffe argues the same by saying the univocity of being 
delineates Ôthe unity of manner in which beings are expressedÉ beings all express 
being in the same way.Õ However, the eternal return excludes the possibility of a 
final unity (Roffe 2012: 14). 
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Chapter 4: What is Philosophy? 
 
The previous chapter dealt with how in order to give immanence its right, Deleuze 
needs to provide a univocal ontology (Bergen 2009: 11). However, while examining 
the problem of immanence we seem to have lost the problem of critique. This 
chapter explores Deleuze and GuattariÕs development of an immanent account of 
philosophy that is necessary for an immanent conception of critique. Starting, by 
differentiating Deleuze and GuattariÕs conception of philosophy from the 
philosophies of Plato, Descartes, Kant and Husserl. Finalizing the chapter by looking 
at Deleuze and GuattariÕs figure of conceptual personae. As we will see, conceptual 
personae allow Deleuze and Guattari to move beyond the subject. Additionally, the 
section on conceptual personae will help clarify some aspects of Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs philosophy such as the relationship between becoming and history and 
the relationship between thought and its territory.  
Philosophy as contemplation, reflection and communication 
 
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as Ôthe art of 
forming, inventing, and fabricating conceptsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2). In 
order to understand the critical impact of Deleuze and GuattariÕs definition we can 
start by looking at the conceptions of philosophy they exclude (MacKenzie 2004: 
28). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words Ôwe can at least see what philosophy is not: it is 
not contemplation, reflection, or communicationÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 6). As 
MacKenzie clarifies, the rejection of philosophy as contemplation is a move from 
PlatoÕs objective idealism, where Ideas pre-exist in a transcendental realm. Second, 
the rejection of philosophy as contemplation can be seen as a move from Descartes 
and KantÕs subjective idealism, where ideas are situated in subjective reflection (in 
the subject who doubts in the case of Descartes and in the subjectÕs transcendental 
categories in the case of Kant). Finally, the departure from philosophy as 
communication can be understood as a move from HusserlÕs intersubjective 
idealism, where the Kantian transcendental subject is grounded in experience and 
Ideas derive from intersubjective interaction (MacKenzie 2004: 28-29, 1997: 7-8).  
 
What is the problem of these three approaches? As MacKenzie clarifies, the 
problem is not contemplation, reflection and communication per se. The problem is 
to confuse philosophical activity itself with these actions, because these three 
concepts are themselves created (MacKenzie 1997: 8). In other words, the problem 
is to set up created concepts as that which represents the uncreated (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 29; MacKenzie 1997: 8). In the case of Plato actual concepts are 
presupposed by the virtual image of what is already-thought; in Descartes the 
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concept ÔI thinkÕ presupposes subjective understanding (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
40); in Kant the ÔI thinkÕ presupposes the subjectÕs undetermined experience (that 
becomes determinable through time) (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 31); and in 
Husserl the ÔI thinkÕ presupposes an intersubjective world of other selves (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 36). To summarize, the problem of Plato, Descartes, Kant and 
Husserl is that they confuse the concepts they create of what it is to think 
(contemplation, reflection and communication respectively) with thought itself 
(MacKenzie 1997: 9).  
How do Deleuze and Guattari avoid this problem? In order to avoid the confusion of 
the concept with thought itself, Deleuze and GuattariÕs philosophy must make sure 
these two aspects of philosophy remain distinct. Therefore philosophy as 
constructivism involves two different but complementary aspects: the creation of 
concepts and the laying out of a plane of immanence (the image of thought) 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36). We can start by examining the first aspect in detail: 
what are concepts for Deleuze and Guattari? Firstly, concepts are multiple. They are 
not simple, as Ôthere is no concept with only one componentÕ; nor universal, Ôneither 
is there a concept possessing every componentÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16). 
For example the Cartesian Cogito is made up of three components: doubting, 
thinking and being; and the Platonic One is made up of two components: being and 
nonbeing (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 25, 29). A concept can be defined by the sum 
of its components, which are totalized in it and give it an irregular contour (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 16-17). In this sense a concept is a whole, but only a fragmentary 
whole: Ôconcepts are not even the pieces of a puzzle, for their irregular contours do 
not correspond to each otherÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 23).  
How can a concept be whole and fragmentary at the same time? As Daniel Smith 
explains Ôthe analytic of concepts presented in What is Philosophy? is an attempt to 
insert the form of time into philosophical conceptsÕ in the form of pure variation 
(Smith 2012: 134). Therefore the problem of Deleuze and GuattariÕs philosophy is to 
create concepts by bringing together different components to form a consistent 
whole; while at the same time leaving the possibility open for the concept and its 
components to disperse and change (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 42). This is what 
Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say a constructivist philosophy unites the 
whole and the fragmentary or the absolute and the relative in the concept (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 22). Concepts are whole or absolute in the sense they mark a 
point of condensation of its own components, the plane and the problem they 
relate to. On the other hand, concepts are relative in three senses: first concepts are 
problematic Ôall concepts are connected to problems without which they would have 
no meaningÕ and everything changes when a new problem is discovered (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994: 16). Second, concepts have a history: every concept Ôhas passed 
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through previous constellations of concepts and been accorded different roles 
within the same constellationÕ (MacKenzie 1997: 8). Third, concepts have a 
becoming because every concept Ôforms a junction with other concepts within the 
same or adjacent field of problemsÕ (MacKenzie 1997: 8). To summarize concepts 
are fragmentary because they are Ôrelative to its own components, to other concepts 
and to the problem it is connected toÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21).  
Now we can turn to the second aspect of a constructivist philosophy Ð the plane of 
immanence. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the philosophy that creates concepts 
Ôalways introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: 
an unlimited One-AllÉ that includes all the concepts on one and the same planeÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 35). In this sense the plane of immanence can be 
understood as the absolute ground or absolute horizon of philosophy, what holds 
the concepts that populate it together and secures the links between them (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 36-37, 41). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words: Ôconcepts are like 
multiple waves, rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave 
that rolls them up and unrolls themÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36).  
However, as Deleuze and Guattari warn us in several occasions Ôit is essential not to 
confuse the plane of immanence and the concepts that occupy itÕ or to assume that 
concepts can be deduced from the plane (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 39-40). A 
constructivist philosophy implies two different moments because the creation of 
concepts and the setting up of a plane are two different activities. While the creation 
of concepts marks the beginning of philosophy; the plane of immanence is pre-
philosophical, it is that which is presupposed by philosophy but does not exist 
independently from it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 40-41). In this sense the plane of 
immanence is also defined as the image of thought. In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words 
Ôthe plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the 
image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to thinkÕ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 37).  
We have already mentioned these presuppositions or image of thought when we 
talked about philosophy as contemplation, reflection and communication confusing 
these created concepts with thought itself (MacKenzie 1997: 9) This criticism can 
now be reformulated as a criticism of transcendence, in opposition to Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs immanent project of philosophy. Where does transcendence come from? 
When we confuse the plane of immanence and the concept, concepts become 
universals (confusing the image of thought with thought itself) (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 35). Universal concepts give rise to transcendence by making immanence 
immanent to themselves (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 49). This was originally the 
case for Plato where immanence is immanent to a higher One - the Object of 
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contemplation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 44, 46, 51). On the other hand, 
Descartes, Kant and Husserl reintroduce transcendence in a different way: by 
making the plane of immanence immanent to the pure consciousness of a 
transcendental subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46; 51). What is the problem of 
transcendence? In the case of Plato, instead of having a plane of immanence that 
encompasses everything - the One-All; immanence is immanent to a transcendent 
One (the object of contemplation), which is superimposed on the immanent One. 
This leads to the plane of immanence being attributed to the concept: the plane of 
immanence Ôonly possesses in a secondary way that which first of all is attributed to 
the transcendent unityÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 44-45). In the case of Descartes, 
Kant and Husserl where immanence is immanent to pure consciousness (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 46) we find what Deleuze describes in The Logic of Sense as a 
Ôvicious circle which makes the condition refer to the conditioned as it reproduces its 
imageÕ (Deleuze 1990: 105). In other words, while the subjectÕs consciousness is 
positioned as that which makes experience possible, the subjectÕs consciousness 
itself is justified in reference to experience (Bryant 2008: 32).  
To summarize, we have established that although Deleuze and Guattari do not deny 
that the activities of contemplation, reflection and communication are activities of 
thought, they nonetheless argue thought cannot be ultimately defined as 
contemplation, reflection and communication. Doing so would posit these concepts 
to the level of transcendental universals, creating a confusion of the plane of 
immanence and the concept, without providing an explanation of how these 
activities themselves came to be (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 49). Furthermore, 
Deleuze and Guattari are wary of universality and transcendence because when 
concepts become transcendent universals, they lose their singularity and their 
openness (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 35). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words 
Ôtranscendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stoppedÕ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 47). This goes against Deleuze and GuattariÕs project of introducing 
continuous variation into philosophical concepts (Smith 2012: 130); and of going 
beyond a representation of states of affairs.   
Thought as movement  
!
If thought cannot be defined as contemplation, reflection and communication, what 
is left? According to Deleuze and Guattari thought is movement: ÔThought demands 
"only" movement that can be carried to infinity. What thought claims by right, what 
it selects, is infinite movement or the movement of the infinite. It is this that 
constitutes the image of thoughtÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37). What makes this 
definition different from the definitions Deleuze and Guattari have distanced 
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themselves from? The first point is also the most simple, in opposition to idealist 
philosophies that set up created concepts as what represents the uncreated 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 29), if all concepts are created, the plane of 
immanence must remain conceptless (MacKenzie, 1997: 10). In other words, the 
concept creation cannot be doubled as the image of thought. By defining thought 
as movement Deleuze and Guattari are ensuring the concept and the plain remain 
distinct.  
Second, a conceptless philosophy also implies Ôthere is no place for a subject and an 
object that can only be conceptsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37-38). Therefore the 
plane of immanence can be described as an impersonal field of thought where there 
is no presupposed subject or object of creation (MacKenzie 1997: 9). As Deleuze 
and Guattari explain, the plane of immanence is made of infinite movement with no 
destination that is not limited to Ôneither objective reference point nor moving 
object that experiences itself as a subjectÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37). Instead, 
Deleuze and Guattari posit the figure of personae that cannot be reduced to the 
philosopher in question or to a specific subject. This figure is going to be analysed 
more in detail later, but for now it should suffice to say that conceptual persona do 
not represent the philosopher, the philosopher is the ÔenvelopeÕ of his main 
conceptual persona and all the other personae who play a role in its own philosophy 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64). As Daniel Smith explains, there is a Ôuniversal 
thought flowÕ that goes through the philosopher but does not originate in him 
(Smith 2012: 141). 
Third, Deleuze and Guattari argue the image of thought must be Ôdistinguished from 
contingent features of the brain or historical opinionsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
37). While contemplation, reflection and communication can be understood as 
different activities of thought, by defining thought and movement they are avoiding 
giving priority to a specific activity, specially the activity of concept creation. It is 
precisely the movement of thought what constitutes the variations of the plane: the 
different images of thought in different times, or even the coexistence of different 
images of thought at the same time (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 38-39; 59).  
Fourth, in order to avoid confusing the plane and the concept a constructivist 
philosophy must institute a nonphilosophical plane of immanence. This means that 
thought is not understood as the aim of philosophy but as the nonphilosophical of 
philosophy (MacKenzie 1997: 10). The reason for this is that thought is not an 
exclusively philosophical activity; for example Ôart thinks no less than philosophyÕ it 
just does so in a different way (through affects and percepts); and the same is true 
for science (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 66, 197). Additionally, as De Beistegui 
explains, if the plane of immanence is not philosophical, this implies that philosophy 
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is never fully able to conceptualize its own image: Ôthe dimension that shapes 
thought most decisively is also the dimension that escapes thought, that thought is 
never quite able to bend backwards towards its own presupposition, and make its 
own image transparent to itselfÕ (De Beistegui 2010: 11). For this reason Deleuze 
and Guattari argue the plane of immanence is the infinite movement which must be 
thought and cannot be thought at the same time. In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words: 
ÔPerhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of 
immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every planeÕ (Deleuze and 
Guattari: 1994: 59).  
Why is the plane of immanence that which must and cannot be thought at the same 
time? As Lord explains, in order to understand this we need to refer to a recurrent 
theme of DeleuzeÕs work on Kant: the difference between being and thinking. In 
Kant, the ÔI amÕ - the being of the self Ð is determined by its own thinking activity. 
The problem is that determination happens is time so Ôthe being that is determined 
is different from the being that is determinable.Õ Therefore, in Kant the determinable 
is that which must be thought but cannot be thought at the same time. This 
problem is evoked in What is Philosophy in terms of the plane of immanence or the 
image of thought (Lord 2012: 82). In the Critique of Pure Reason, KantÕs posits the 
subject as a legislator whose role is to assure reason remains Ôwithin the bounds of 
possible experienceÕ and what is not is excluded from the plane (Lord 2012: 95-98). 
This means there is an inside that can be thought in conceptual terms and an 
outside that can only be thought in speculative terms (Lord 2012: 97). As Lord points 
out, Kant makes a double gesture: he reveals the unthinkable at the heart of 
thought and he conceals it (Lord 2012: 98). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari Ôshow us 
what philosophy is by playing out the impossibility and the exigency of thinking its 
own unthinkable sourcesÕ (Lord 2012: 99). Smith provides another way of 
understanding the same problem this time terms of aesthetics and the limits of the 
faculty of imagination: ÔFrom the empirical point of view, this limit is inaccessible and 
unimaginable; but from the transcendental point of view, it is that which can only be 
imagined, that which is accessible only to the imagination in its transcendental 
exerciseÕ (Smith 2012: 93) 
Before finalizing, as MacKenzie clarifies, Deleuze and Guattari are aware that there is 
no perfect philosophy, all philosophies can fall into the problem of confusing the 
concept and the plane of immanence, and of course the plane of immanence is 
ultimately a concept itself; the point is to attempt to keep the plane and the concept 
as separate as possible so the plane remains immanent to itself. (MacKenzie 1997: 
10). How does the plane of immanence remain immanent to itself? Although it 
might initially seem like the image of thought as pure moment confuses Ôthe 
ÔmentalÕ concept of creation with the ÔphysicalÕ plane of beingÕ (MacKenzie 1997: 
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10). Deleuze and GuattariÕs are actually getting rid of this opposition so there is no 
distinction between conceptual innovation and actual innovation (MacKenzie 2004: 
66). How do they eliminate this opposition? This opposition is eliminated by a 
vitalist ontology5, where Deleuze and Guattari create a link between thinking and 
being through movement. In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words: Ômovement is not the 
image of thought without being also the substance of beingÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 38). It is for this reason Deleuze and Guattari are able to make the claim that 
Ôone does not think without becoming something elseÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
42). In this sense, philosophy can be understood as an activity that is Ôco-extensive 
with activity in the world itselfÕ (MacKenzie 2004: 66). 
Conceptual Personae 
!
As already mentioned, Deleuze and GuattariÕs constructivist philosophy Ð 
philosophy as Ôthe art of forming, inventing, and fabricating conceptsÕ Ð involves two 
aspects: the creation of concepts and the setting up of a plane of immanence 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2; 36). In order to avoid transcendence, the plane of 
immanence and the concept must not be confused (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 39). 
However, one question still has to be answered: how do we conceptualize the 
relation between the plane and the concept, in order to avoid confusing them? As 
MacKenzie explains, following DeleuzeÕs work on Hume, the relation between the 
plane and the concept can be understood as external to their own terms (MacKenzie 
1997: 11; Deleuze 1994: x). Why are relations external to their own terms? Deleuze 
postulates the idea that relations are external to their own terms (as opposed to 
internal relations) in order to move from the principle of identity (Crockett 2013: 17-
18). This means that what relates the concept and the plane is not something 
internal to them, rather the relation follows its own external logic, in this case 
mediated by conceptual personae (MacKenzie 1997: 11; 2004: 35).  
What are conceptual personae? First it is important to clarify that conceptual 
personae are not another name to refer to the thinking subject or to a philosopher 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64). Deleuze and GuattariÕs constructivist philosophy is 
connected to a radical empiricism, where the plane of immanence or image of 
thought is no longer immanent to a subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 47-48). Why 
is the subject problematic for Deleuze and Guattari? First, as already mentioned 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
!Although Deleuze and Guattari do not use the term vitalism in What is Philosophy? In the 
context of Deleuze and Guattari work, a vitalist ontology can be understood as an ontology 
of Ôdifferential vitalismÉ which introduces change into the very mechanics of lifeÕ as opposed 
to nineteenth century vitalism which argues there is a vital force made up of dead matter 
behind life (MacKenzie 1997: 17) 
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when highlighting the difference between Deleuze and GuattariÕs constructivist 
philosophy and the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, making the plane 
of immanence immanent to a subject reintroduces transcendence, while Deleuze 
and Guattari aim to give an immanent account of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 46, 51). Second, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to move beyond the 
distinction between the thinking subject and the world as an object of thought, in 
favor of a conception of philosophy as Ôan activity co-extensive with activity in the 
world itselfÕ (MacKenzie 2004: 66). Third, as Williams clarifies, attributing thought to 
a subject cannot account for the individuality of thoughts, or what makes the 
thought of one person different to another (Williams 2003: 203-204).  
 
If conceptual personae are not a replacement of the subject, who are they? Firstly, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue conceptual personae are the condition for the exercise 
of thought (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 4). However it is important to clarify that this 
does not mean thought originates in conceptual personae, as this would imply that 
conceptual personae are a replacement of the thinking subject. If thought does not 
originate in the conceptual personae, where does thought comes from? As Deleuze 
argues in Difference and Repetition and Proust and Signs, thought does not 
originate in an individual with a natural capacity to think and an affinity with truth 
(Deleuze 2001: 130-131). In opposition to this traditional image of thought, Deleuze 
argues thought originates involuntarily in the contingency or accident of the 
encounter, when something forces us to think (Deleuze 1994: 138-139; 2008: 12). In 
DeleuzeÕs words: Ôit is precisely the contingency of the encounter that guarantees 
the necessity of what it leads us to thinkÕ (Deleuze 2008: 62). There is a violence to 
thought that forces each of the faculties to reach their limit in order to go beyond 
the world we recognize (Deleuze 2008: 62; 1994: 145). Thus the impersonal nature 
of thought: ÔI am no longer myself but thought's aptitude for finding itself and 
spreading across a plane that passes through me at several placesÕ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 64). 
 
Second, as opposed to a pre-given subject, conceptual personae are invented by 
philosophy, just as the plane of immanence is laid out, and concepts are created. 
The three elements of a constructivist philosophy are fabricated, as opposed to 
being already given, and they are united by their moment of creation but must 
remain distinct (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 76-77). This is where the role of 
conceptual personae becomes crucial for ensuring the three aspects of a 
constructivist philosophy are coherent but distinct. Deleuze and Guattari describe 
conceptual personae as mysterious figures that have a Ôhazy existence halfway 
between concept and preconceptual plane, passing from one to the otherÕ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 61). Why a hazy existence? They have a hazy existence because 
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they exist in between the concept and the plane preforming what might seem as 
contradictory roles. On one side, they must ensure the correspondence of the 
concept and the plane. In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words the correspondence 
between concept and plane Ôgoes beyond even simple resonances and introduces 
instances adjunct to the creation of concepts, namely, conceptual personaeÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 40). On the other hand, conceptual personae also have 
to make sure the concept and the plane are not assimilated into one another; or that 
they do not merge into the conceptual persona itself. Therefore, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue there is a relationship of coadaptation between the three instances of 
philosophy without ever merging into one another (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 75-
77).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari also ensure the concept and the plane of immanence remain 
distinct by attributing different features to each of them, while the concept is made 
up of intensive features, the plane is composed of diagrammatic features (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 39-40). These features will show us two different characteristics 
of conceptual personae. First, the concept is intensive in the sense that it Ôdoes not 
have spatiotemporal coordinatesÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21). In other words, 
concepts are not actual entities (Boundas 2005a: 131). We will explain this more in 
detail when we talk about DeleuzeÕs distinction between the actual and the virtual; 
for now it should suffice to say that although concepts can be actualized in bodies 
and states of affairs, they cannot be reduced to them. Therefore the role of 
conceptual personae is not only to think about concepts, but most importantly 
conceptual personae feel and perceive concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 131). 
Second, diagrammatic features of the plane of immanence are expressed in 
movement. The role of conceptual personae is to express different types of 
movements depending on the image of thought they personify. For example in the 
traditional image of thought, thought is about turning towards the truth. While in 
the eighteenth century thought is about following the track of knowledge (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 53).  
 
Different conceptual personae not only express different movements but they also 
personify different presuppositions of what it means to think and of the role of 
philosophy. For example in DescartesÕ philosophy, between the concept of the 
cogito and the image of thought that everyone knows what it means to think and 
everyone wants the truth, stands the conceptual persona of the idiot Ð a private 
thinker who doubts everything in order to arrive to truth by himself (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 61-62, 70; 1994: 129; Alliez 2004: 9). In Greek philosophy we have 
the conceptual persona of the friend who pursues wisdom and who has a 
relationship of rivalry with other claimants who share the love for wisdom but are 
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also rivals in this pursuit (Deleuze 1994: 3-4, 71). Additionally, conceptual personae 
are not only different from each other, but they also change over time, playing an 
important role for the transformation of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 5). 
For example, a different kind of idiot resurfaces in Dostoyevsky. This idiot is still 
related to the old idiot we found in Descartes, but this time instead of looking for 
the truth as in Descartes, he is looking for the absurd and the incomprehensible 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 63). This shows how the role and characteristics of 
conceptual personae change depending on the different planes of immanence they 
occupy and concepts they bring together (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari portray philosophy as mobile, as being in a constant 
transformation. How can we reconcile this with the fact that concepts and 
conceptual personae are always dated and signed? (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 8) 
For example: AristotleÕs concept of substance or NietzscheÕs conceptual persona 
Zarathustra (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7; 64). According to Deleuze and Guattari, 
although concepts would not be able to exist without the signature of their creators, 
concepts also Ôhave their own way of not dying while remaining subject to 
constraints of renewalÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 8). The reason for this is that 
concepts and conceptual personae cannot be reduced to the philosopher who 
created them or to their time (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64). As Craig LundyÕs 
explains they Ôhave a life independent of the philosophers that both create and use 
themÕ (Lundy 2012: 165).  
This raises two questions. First, if conceptual personae cannot be reduced to the 
philosopher, what is the relationship between the philosopher and conceptual 
personae? And second, if a constructivist philosophy is related to its epoch but it 
can also go beyond it, what is the relationship between creation and history? We 
can begin by examining the first question regarding the relationship between the 
philosopher and conceptual personae. As already mentioned, Deleuze and Guattari 
attempt to think of philosophy as an activity that is coextensive with the world 
(MacKenzie 2004: 66). This means getting rid of the opposition between the 
thinking subject and the world by providing an impersonal conception of thought. 
This also means the opposition between the philosopher and philosophy (including 
the concept and conceptual personae) collapses. If the opposition between the 
philosopher and conceptual personae crumbles, how can we understand their 
relation? Deleuze and Guattari argue there is a relationship of double becoming 
between the philosopher and conceptual personae. On one side, Ôthe philosopher is 
only the envelope of his principal conceptual personaÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
64). On the other side, just as the philosopher becomes his conceptual personae, 
conceptual personae become the philosopher: ÔDionysus becomes philosopher at 
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the same time that Nietzsche becomes DionysusÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 65). 
This shows how there is no pre-given subject of philosophy just as there are no 
historically given conceptual personae; there is only a simultaneous becoming of the 
philosopher and conceptual personae aA the activity of thinking transforms them 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 65-64; 42).  
 
Moving on to the second question, what does it mean to create for Deleuze and 
Guattari? As MacKenzie points out, Deleuze and GuattariÕs work can be understood 
as an attempt to move beyond the opposition between historical and ahistorical 
accounts of creation: where creation is either conceived as creation ex nihilo, which 
means creation without history; or creation is conceived as simply a new 
arrangement of already existing elements (MacKenzie 2004: 74). In Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs words Ôconcepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodiesÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 5); and concepts Ôare never created from nothingÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 19). As MacKenzie clarifies, the problem with both 
approaches is that they Ôboth rely in positing a transcendent identity prior to the 
creative act.Õ Either by setting a void between the world and what is created and 
thus making the creative act transcendent to reality, in the case of creation ex nihilo; 
or by positioning history itself as that which transcends its own pre-given unfolding, 
in the case of historical accounts (MacKenzie 2004: 74).  
 
How can creation be conceived beyond this opposition? Deleuze and Guattari 
provide a useful way of thinking about creation by saying conceptual personae can 
be understood as cultivators, the plane of immanence as the ground and concepts 
as seeds (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7). This description is important because it 
shows how concepts are related to the ground where they grow from and to the 
cultivators, without being reduced to them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 76-77). This 
brings us to the relationship between history and becoming. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, created concepts are related to the historical time from which they 
emerge from, while at the same time having the potential to go beyond it and 
becoming something new (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70). In this sense, creativity 
can be understood as Ôthat which remains historicalÉ but also that which maintains 
the openness of the future (MacKenzie 2004: 74). This definition of creativity also 
applies to our understanding of conceptual personae. What is the relationship of 
conceptual personae to history and becoming? Conceptual personae emerge in a 
given historical period to which they are related, without being reduced to it 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 67; 70). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words Ôconceptual 
personae and psychosocial types refer to each other and combine without ever 
mergingÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70). This means that although conceptual 
personae might have certain characteristics that might be related to their epoch, 
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they are also susceptible to being determined by the power of pure thought which 
takes them beyond their historical experience into the event (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 70, 67). 
 
What is the event? As Deleuze and Guattari explain in What is Philosophy? The 
event can be initially understood in contrast to the state of affairs or as that which 
Ôeludes its own actualization in everything that happensÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
156, 52, 101). On one side we have history or the state of affairs as the set of 
conditions that determine our life; and on the other side we have becoming which 
Ôwrests itself from this history in order to createÕ something new. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue the event and philosophy (including its concepts and conceptual 
personae) belong to becoming as the unhistorical element that allows them to go 
beyond the state of affairs (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 96). However, the event and 
philosophy can also be actualized in a state of affairs or a body (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 156). This means there is a much more complex relationship between 
the event and the states of affairs, a relationship that goes beyond a simple 
opposition. While events can be actualized in states of affairs, states of affairs also 
hold a potential for being absorbed into the event and being transformed (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 153).  
 
What is the relationship between philosophy and the event? Deleuze and Guattari 
argue the task of a constructivist philosophy is to Ôextract an event from things and 
beingsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 33). How is this done? To answer this question 
we have to look at the relationship between the event and the different aspects of a 
constructivist philosophy. Regarding the creation of concepts, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue Ôthe philosophical concept does not refer to the lived, by a way of 
compensation, but consists, through its own creation, in setting up an eventÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 34). In other words, it is the event - and not the state of 
affairs - which gives philosophy its consistency (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21, 126). 
For example DescartesÕ concept of the cogito, configured as the activity of doubting 
thinking and being, represents an event that is always being renewed (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 24). Second, the plane of immanence can be understood as the 
absolute horizon or reserve of concepts that make up the event, that which takes the 
concept beyond the states of affairs, and is never exhausted by the concept 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36). Finally, conceptual personae relate to the event as 
that which express or embody the possible worlds that are created by concepts 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 47-48).  
 
The relationship between Deleuze and GuattariÕs constructivist philosophy and the 
event shows how philosophy can constitute a call Ôfor a future form, for a new earth 
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and people that do not yet existÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 108). In this way, 
Deleuze and Guattari describe philosophyÕs task as utopian in a non-conventional 
sense of the term: not as a dream or as the realization of an imagined state of affairs, 
rather than as that which connects philosophy to the present in order to move away 
from it. According to Deleuze and Guattari, it is at this point that Ôphilosophy 
becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest pointÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 99-100). Here there is a strong resonance between 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs critical philosophy and FoucaultÕs. In FoucaultÕs words: Ôit is a 
question of searching for another kind of critical philosophyÉÕ Moving away from 
the Kantian project Ôto determine the conditions and the limits of our possible 
knowledge of the objectÉÕ into an affirmative and creative conception of critique: 
ÔÉa critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of 
transforming the subject, of transforming ourselvesÕ (Foucault 2016: 24). 
 
Similarly to Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari institute a connection between 
philosophy and critique, however we still have to clarify how is this connection 
made. The answer is through the relationship between thought and the earth and 
territory. According to Deleuze and Guattari Õthinking takes place in the relationship 
of territory and the earthÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 85). For example the 
emergence of the Greek conceptual persona of the friend who shares the love of 
wisdom with other friends, who are also his rivals, coincides with the formation of 
the city, which is made up of equal entities that are also rivals (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 4). Why are the earth and territory so important? The earth, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, is constantly experiencing a movement of territorialization 
and deterritorialization: Ôthe earth is not one element among others but rather 
brings together all the elements within a single embrace while using one or another 
of them to deterritorialize territoryÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 85). Therefore, the 
earth is constantly opening territories and having territories restored to it (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 86). What is the relationship between philosophy and these 
territories? Deleuze and Guattari argue concepts are referred to a territory instead of 
an object. This means two things, first that the creation of concepts involves a 
reterritorialization of the earth; and second that concepts have a past, present and a 
possible future territory (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 101). In the case of conceptual 
personae as thinkers, they show us the territory of thought with its 
deterritorializations and territorializations (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70). For this 
reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue conceptual personae institute a point of view in 
relation to thought, where we can distinguish different conceptual personae 
inhabiting different planes of immanence or bringing them together; and playing 
and important role for their transformation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 75).  
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Finally, as MacKenzie demonstrates, Deleuze and GuattariÕs discussion of 
conceptual personae can be used to develop an account of the role of the social 
critic. This account avoids any presupposition of the role of the critic - for example 
the critic as creator. Additionally, this definition also avoids situating the critic 
outside critique, which would render critique impure by allowing the existence of 
certain unquestioned elements beyond the scope of critique itself (MacKenzie 1997: 
7; 2004: 65-67). Alternatively, MacKenzie argues the critic can be understood as Ôthe 
mediator of lifeÕs creative power and the differences it createsÕ (MacKenzie 2004: 
69). Situating the critic at the intersection between becoming and being (MacKenzie 
2004: 71, 73). Just as conceptual personae are situated between history and 
becoming. The consequence of this is that the critic is not an identifiable subject; its 
existence is merely transitory in the process of creation (MacKenzie 2004: 71). 
! 55 
Chapter 5: What is Art? 
 
This chapter will focus on Deleuze and GuattariÕs book Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature, as the most positive expression of immanent critique. However, before 
turning to Kafka, the chapter will explore Deleuze and GuattariÕs exposition of the 
power of art, language and literature to transform our world. This chapter is about 
creating movement and multiplying connections: the connection of art with the 
world in order to create a movement of deterritorialization; the connection of 
language and politics through the establishment of order, and the possibility of 
disrupting that order; the relationship between major languages and major literature 
as constants, and the minor and its revolutionary potential as that which creates 
variation within the constant. All of these connections are expressed in Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs reading of KafkaÕs as the most political and social author (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1986: 42). According to Deleuze and Guattari, KafkaÕs literary machine - 
made up of KafkaÕs letters, stories and novels Ð seeks to convert everything into 
assemblages in order to dismantle those assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 
47). To be more precise, Kafka attempts to dismantle three aspects of the law: 
transcendence, the interiority of guilt, and subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 
45). Moving away from critique as representation of the world, into a critique that 
uses humour in order to create a comic amplification that shows lines of escape, a 
critique that creates movements and connections as ways of becoming-other and 
transforming the world, and a critique that connects the individual to the political.  
 
What is Art? 
 
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari argue the role of art is not to provide 
an immobile picture of the world, but to create blocs of sensations Ð percepts and 
affects - that stand up on their own (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 164). Percepts and 
affects stand on their own because they are independent of an object of reference, 
of the artist that created them, and of anyone who experiences them (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 163-164; 166). Art preserves and is preserved, but what is preserved 
is not the lived experience, nor the material condition of art, but the percept or 
affect in itself (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 166). In this sense, art is not about 
resemblance, art is about pure sensation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 167). 
Sensation is not merely realized in the material and exists only in relation to it, rather 
Ôthe material passes into sensationÕ becoming expressive (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994: 166-167, 193). By becoming expressive, art adds varieties to the world and 
creates zones of indetermination that dissolve the lived experience, allowing us to 
go beyond opinions (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 173-175). Art confronts the chaos, 
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Ôthe infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishesÕ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 118); to create sensations that challenge opinions (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 204). For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue that art is not about 
commemorating or celebrating the past but about present sensations and 
becoming-other (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 167; 176). What is peculiar about art is 
that it passes through the finite, which is the material condition of art, to rediscover 




We are now looking at Deleuze and GuattariÕs work on language in plateau four of A 
Thousand Plateaus, where Deleuze and Guattari argue language has the power to 
both order our world and to transform it; and where they forge an immanent 
connection between language and politics.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari begin the plateau by arguing that the main function of 
language is not communication and information but the transmission of order-words 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 85). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words Ôinformation is only 
the strict minimum necessary for the emission, transmission, and observation of 
orders as commandsÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76). What Deleuze and Guattari 
are referring to here is the power of language to shape and order our world (Porter 
2009: 1-2; Holland 2013: 78). As we will see this definition is important for two 
reasons. First they Ôinsist on affirming the power, vitality or capacity Ð the autonomy 
Ð of language to intervene directly in the social and political field.Õ Second, they 
dismantle the idea that the primary role of language is representation (Porter 2009: 
1).  
 
How does language order our world? Firstly, language orders our world through 
giving orders. Deleuze and GuattariÕs example of this is a schoolteacher instructing 
her students a grammatical rule; what the schoolteacher is doing is not merely 
informing her students, but commanding them or imposing on them the 
foundations of grammar (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 75-75). However, order-words 
are not only limited to the imperative use of language. As Holland explains 
Ôcommands are only the most obvious instance of order-wordsÕ (Holland 2013: 78). 
There is also a relation between speech and actions, where the action is 
accomplished in saying it or speaking. For example I swear by saying ÔI swearÕ; or 
when I say ÔI love youÕ I am not only expressing my love, I am also making a promise. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, these speech acts are coextensive with 
language; language cannot be defined independently from them (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 77). This implies order-words are not a specific category of 
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statements, for example imperative statements, but Ôthe relation of every word or 
every statementÉ to speech acts that are, and can only be, accomplished in the 
statementÕ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 79).  
 
It is important to note that by arguing language cannot be defined independently 
from speech acts, Deleuze and Guattari are providing a critique of linguistics. As 
pointed out by Holland, Deleuze and Guattari are positioning pragmatics Ð Ôthe 
study of the use and effects of language in social contextÕ Ð at the centre of 
linguistics, instead of merely seeing it as a sub-discipline. What Deleuze and 
Guattari are saying is that factors that are usually considered external to language 
are actually inseparable and internal to language (Holland 2013: 79; Deleuze and 
Guattari 1997: 85, 91, 94). As we will see next, Deleuze and Guattari also critique 
linguistics for tying enunciation to a subject without recognizing its social character 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 82).  
 
Third, language orders our world through indirect discourse. Language goes 
beyond one person communicating what she has seen to another person. Language 
Ôgoes from saying to sayingÕ transmitting what we have heard to other people, from 
a second party to a third party and so on, perpetuating a certain order of the world 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76-77). This is important for two reasons, first it shows 
how the primary role of language is not the communication of information, because 
most of what it is said is basically repeating what we have heard. Second, it implies 
it is not a question about the origin of language (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76-77), 
as there is no subject of enunciation to which we can attribute the order-word 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 89; Holland 2013: 78).  
 
If speech acts cannot be defined in reference to a subject of enunciation, what 
explains a speech act? Deleuze and Guattari argue that the relationship between 
acts and statement can be explained by a social obligation, therefore enunciation 
has an intrinsic social character. This social character is accounted by what Deleuze 
and Guattari call a collective assemblage of enunciation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
79-80). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words Ôit is the assemblage, as it freely appears in 
this discourse that explains all the voices present within a single voiceÕ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 80). Before explaining what a collective assemblage is, it is worth 
noting what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they talk about the voices present 
within a single voice. What Deleuze and Guattari are referring to is the redundancy 
of language as order-words. Language is redundant in different senses for example 
in what is being repeated from saying to saying, and also there is a redundancy 
between speech and act; in other words there is a prior order that is being repeated 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 75; 80; 84). Moving on, a collective assemblage can be 
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understood as the social context of a statement, its particular place and time 
(Holland 2013: 78). For example, in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue the statement is a function of the national, political or social 
community (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 84). However, it is important to clarify that 
Deleuze and Guattari are not saying that there are no individual statements or 
subjects of enunciation, what they are saying is that collective assemblages come 
first and individual statements and subjects of enunciation are derived from them, 
not the other way around (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 80; Holland 2013: 78).  
 
What are the effects of collective assemblages of enunciation? Here is where the 
power of language to shape the world is the most evident. Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that collective assemblages designate the relation between statements and 
the incorporeal transformations they express (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 81). 
Incorporeal transformations can be understood as a transformation that has no 
immediate effects on the body of a person, but it is still a transformation (Holland 
2013 79). For example when a judge declares an accused man guilty, the man is 
immediately transformed into a convict; a declaration of war or peace that 
immediately changes the status of the participants; or the transformation of 
passengers into hostages on a plane (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 80-81). An 
incorporeal transformation can be recognized by the simultaneity of the statement 
that expresses the transformation and the effect that is produced (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 81).  
 
This means the relation between the transformation and enunciation is internal, 
there is an immanent relation between language and bodies. The implication of this 
is that we cannot ignore the circumstances of a given statement. For example the 
statement ÔI swearÕ is different depending on where it is said, it will not be the same 
statement or the same transformation if it is said in a court as opposed to a family 
situation for example. Therefore, the immediacy of a statement Ôgives it a power of 
variation in relation to the bodies to which the transformation is attributedÕ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 82). This means two things, first that there is an excess in 
language that cannot be accounted by constants (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 82). 
The second implication is that there is an immanent relation between politics and 
language. As Deleuze and Guattari explain Ôpolitics works language from withinÕ 
producing a change in order-words. This means a statement can only be evaluated I 
relation to the political circumstances that provide the conditions of possibility of 
language (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 83, 85). 
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Minor and major language 
!
In the same passage of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari also provide a 
distinction between minor and major that can be used in reference to music, 
literature, linguistic, politics, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 105). The problem 
Deleuze and Guattari are addressing with this distinction is the relationship between 
constants and variation, where the major is given the power of constants and the 
minor is given the power of variation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 101). In this sense 
the major can be understood as an abstract constant, a standard of measurement 
that we use to evaluate the world; while the minor is that which is always becoming. 
This implies two things, first, that the distinction between minority and majority is 
not simply a quantitative distinction, where the most numerous group conforms the 
major and the least numerous conforms the minor. For example, although there 
might be more mosquitoes or women than ÔmanÕ, man can still be understood as 
the major because he appears twice: once in the standard and once in the variable. 
The second implication is that the major, being an abstract standard is actually never 
anybody; while the minor is everybody else. The minor is constantly becoming and 
potentially deviating from this model. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari are giving 
the minor a creative and revolutionary power of becoming-other (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 105-106). 
 
In the case of language, what is the relationship between minor and major 
languages? Firstly, to avoid misunderstandings it is important to note that the 
distinction between minor and major does not mean that there is a simple and clear 
opposition between a major language and its different dialects; in fact each minor 
language has a zone of variation to the point that it is difficult to delimit where one 
minor language ends and the other starts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 101-102). 
For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue that a minor language can only be 
defined in relation to the major language it functions from. For example French from 
Quebec has to be evaluated in relation to major French and in relation to major 
English (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 102). Additionally, the relational aspect of 
language means a language can be minor and major at the same time. For example 
in the Austrian Empire, Czech was a minor language in relation to German and 
German from Prague was a minor language in relation to German from Vienna 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 104). In this sense there are not two different types of 
languages; rather there are two possible treatments or usages of the same 
language: the first treatment is about extracting constants from language and the 
second treatment is about extracting continuous variation from language (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 103; 107). For this reason Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 
problem is not actually about the distinction between a major and a minor 
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language; the problem is about becoming, of deterritorializing or transforming the 
major language (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 104). The more a language becomes 
major, the more it can be affected by variations that reverse it into a minor language 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 102). The consequence of this is that we can say that 
minor languages are more than sublanguages; they are the potential agents for the 
major language becoming-minoritarian (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 106).  
 
As Holland summarizes, what Deleuze and Guattari do in plateau 4 is first to 
emphasize the power of variation of language, instead of focusing on constants. 
Second, they elevate the minor to the universal revolutionary figure over the 
abstract major, giving it the power of deterritorializing the major. Third, they posit 
pragmatics at the center of linguistics, instead than at the margin. Finally, at the end 
of the passage Deleuze and Guattari return to the concept of order-words to give it 
a new power, the power of disordering and transformation (Holland 2013: 81). In 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs words, the other aspect of the order-word is flight (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 108). The question now becomes, not how to escape the order-
world, but rather Ôhow to maintain or draw out the revolutionary potentiality of the 
order-wordÕ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9). There are two possibilities: first the 
stratification of order words, and second words of passage that exist beneath order-
words. In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words, Ôa single thing or word undoubtedly has this 
twofold nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other Ð to transform the 
compositions of order into components of passage (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987:110).  
KafkaÕs minor literature 
!
Deleuze and Guattari define a minor literature as Ôthat which a minority constructs 
within a major languageÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 16). This means that a minor 
literature is not derived from a major language; rather it works from within language 
to transform it. In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words Ôminor no longer designates specific 
literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of 
what is called great (or established) literatureÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 18). 
Therefore, the first aspect of minor literature is that it affects language Õwith a high 
coefficient of deterritorializationÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 16). In other words, a 
major language is subjected to a defamiliarizing movement through minor literature 
(Porter 2009: 2). For example KafkaÕs defamiliarization of the concept of law, where 
he moves from a transcendental conception to an immanent conception, we will 
come back to this point further on (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 43). The second 
aspect of minor literature is that as opposed to major literature, where social 
concerns are seen as an extension or the background of individual concerns; in 
major literature the individual is immediately linked to the political, Ôeverything in 
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them is political.Õ For example we can see how in Kafka the family triangle is directly 
connected to other triangles, like the economic or juridical triangles (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 17).  The force of the judges, commissioners, bureaucrats, etcetera 
are combined in the father, rather than being a substitute for him, and it is the father 
who submits to them and has a role in the submission of the son (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 12). Hence, the third characteristic of minor literature: Ôeverything 
takes on a collective valueÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 17). It is important to note 
that this does not mean that the individual concern disappears or is unimportant. As 
we will see, the opposite is the case. Deleuze and Guattari challenge the opposition 
between the individual and the collective (Beaulieu 2009: 210; Porter 2009: 21). The 
implication of this is that, in Deleuze and GuattariÕs words, Ôthe individual concern 
thus becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole 
other story is vibrating within itÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 17).  
 
KafkaÕs Literary Machine 
!
As Robert Porter explains, Ôif language has a power and capacity to order our 
worldÉ then KafkaÕs body of literary works avail of this powerÕ (Porter 2009: 6). 
However, it is important to note that Deleuze and Guattari provide a really 
provocative reading of Kafka. As Porter notes, Deleuze and GuattariÕs work on Kafka 
itself can be understood as an intervention, which gives it new attributes and 
defamiliarizes common scholarly interpretations (Porter 2009: 19). Firstly, Deleuze 
and Guattari provide a Ôcritique of all readings of Kafka that are founded on a logic 
of representation and interpretationÕ (Bogue 1989: 108). This includes 
psychoanalytical readings that interpret Kafka in Oedipal terms and religious 
readings that interpret Kafka as an advocate of a negative theology. Most 
importantly, what Deleuze and Guattari want to avoid is the temptation of drawing 
Kafka toward the Ôindividual concernÉ towards personal psychology, neurosis, or an 
authorÕs individual tastesÕ (Bensmaa 1986: xviii). As Porter points out, the problem 
of overemphasizing the individual is that it presupposes a disconnection to the 
social, creating a distinction that Deleuze and Guattari want to avoid: the distinction 
between KafkaÕs life and the life that transverses his writing (Porter 2009: 19). As 
Deleuze tells us in Negotiations, there is a power of life that can be found in a line of 
writing and in art: Ôany work of art points a way through for life, finds a way through 
the cracksÕ (Deleuze 1995: 143). In this sense KafkaÕs work is deeply connected to 
the social and the political, far from fleeing the world he is drawing lines of escape, 
Ônever has there been a more political and social authorÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986: 41-42; 46). However, as Claire Colebrook warns us, we have to be careful with 
vitalistic readings of Deleuze (and GuattariÕs) conception of art. The image of life 
proliferating through the work of art might rob art from its radical potential by 
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ignoring its power of disruption (Colebrook 2007: 29). As we will see, art is not 
about the continuation of life but about the Ôpotentiality of life beyond its defining 
territoryÕ (Colebrook 2007: 30).  
 
In opposition to psychoanalytical or theological readings of Kafka, which tend to 
emphasise the individual aspect of his work, Deleuze and Guattari argue KafkaÕs 
work (including the letters, stories and novels) is Ôa rhizome, a borrowÕ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1986: 3; 41). What is a rhizome? A rhizome book can be understood as a 
multiplicity, which connects a diverse range of elements in a non-hierarchical way 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 8-9; Bogue 2001: 107). There are three important 
aspects of Deleuze and GuattariÕs definition of rhizome in Kafka. First, what is 
important about a rhizome is not the point of entry, there is no privileged entrance, 
so you can enter it at any point; rather what is important is the connections between 
these points: Ôwhat crossroads and galleries one passes through to link two points, 
what the map of the rhizome isÉÕ The second important aspect is the possibility of 
modification of this map: Ôhow the map is modified if one enters by another point.Õ 
Thirdly, the principle of multiple entrances is important because it makes it harder 
for interpretation of the work, as there is no pre-established way of accessing the a 
text, favoring the possibility of open experimentation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 
3). 
 
Moreover, as Eugene Holland points out, the image of the rhizome Deleuze and 
Guattari develop in Kafka can be understood as a new image of thought. This image 
of thought was restated one year later in Rhizome, the introduction of A Thousand 
Plateaus (1976) (Holland 2013: 11-12). What is a rhizome book? It is a book that 
doesnÕt rely on Ôobject nor subjectÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 3). As explained by 
Holland, it does not rely on subjects in order to provide an image of thought that 
allows us to think with the world instead of thinking about the world (representation) 
(Holland 2013: 37). This impersonal conception of thought can be traced back to 
Spinoza and NietzscheÕs influence on Deleuze. For Spinoza, thought is not limited to 
thinking subjects; it is an attribute of the world (Holland 2013: 37). In other words, 
there is a Ôcontinuous flow of thought in the universeÕ that does not originate in a 
subject (Smith 2012: 141). Nietzsche argues something similar by pointing out 
Ôthought comes when ÒitÓ wishes, and not when ÒIÓ wishÕ so it is a mistake to place 
the subject as the condition of thought (Nietzsche 1984: 54). 
 
On the other side, a rhizome book does not rely on objects, in order to avoid the 
distinction between the book and the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). This 
distinction is avoided because the book functions as a machinic assemblage; that is 
constantly forming new connections to other machines (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 
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82; Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 5; Coleman 2005: 239); The concept of the machine 
was first developed in Anti-Oedipus (Bogue 2003: 4); where Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that everything is a machine, real machines not figurative ones: the motherÕs 
breast producing milk, the mouth, the individual, the stars and rainbows in the sky 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 1-2). This means that there is no longer a distinction 
between man and nature, Ôonly a process that produces the one within the other 
and couples machines togetherÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 2). Additionally, the 
concept of the machine does not particularly refer to men and women in their 
labour activity; but to the whole field of social activities such as leisure and personal 
relationships. In other words, what Deleuze and Guattari are referring to is not a 
technical machine; but a social machine, made up of a multiplicity of heterogeneous 
elements such as men, women, relations, ideas, animals, manufactured objects, etc. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 8; 81; Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 56, 69).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari approach KafkaÕs work from the perspective of the machine 
(Bogue 2003: 4). As Bogue explains, in Kafka the problem of the machine is the 
question of the relationship between the literary machine and the real (Bogue 2003: 
59). The book, as a machinic assemblage Ôhas only itself, in connection with other 
assemblagesÉÕ For example in Kafka the literary machine was connected to the 
bureaucratic machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4); and the literary machine can 
also be linked to the capitalist or fascist machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 60). 
Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari also talk about the intersection between the 
familial, conjugal and bureaucratic machines in Kafka (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 
65). In this sense, individual concerns are always connected to the collective and 
writing is always connected to the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 60). For this 
reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Ôthere is no difference between what a 
book talks about and how it is madeÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). So the 
question when looking at a book shifts from the meaning of the book to how it 
functions and in connection to what it functions (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). As 
Deleuze claims in Proust and Signs, Ôthe modern work of art has no problem of 




How does KafkaÕs literary machine work? Deleuze and Guattari argue that KafkaÕs 
literary machine is made up of three components: the letters, the stories and the 
novels (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 40). We can start by looking at the letters. As 
explained by Bogue, the aim of KafkaÕs letters is to maintain the letter exchange, 
while avoiding the entrapment of marriage (Bogue 2003: 4). As already mentioned, 
the main question when looking at the literary machine is the question of its 
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function. In the case of the letters, their first characteristic is that they function as a 
replacement for love and the conjugal contract, Ôthe flux of letters replaces seeing, 
arrivingÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 29; 31). A diabolical pact emerges through the 
letters, to keep writing, to maintain the flow, while avoiding the proximity of the 
conjugal contract (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 33; Bogue 2003: 76).  
 
Second, Deleuze and Guattari argue that there are two subjects in the letters: the 
subject of enunciation, who writes the letter and can be understood as the form of 
expression; and the subject of the statement, that can be understood as the form of 
content (which is different to the addressee of the letter). According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, what Kafka is trying to do in the letters is to play with this duality by 
assigning movement to the subject of the statement instead of the subject of 
enunciation. It is the sending of the letter, its path that expresses this movement.  By 
reversing the relationship between the two subjects, Kafka produces a doubling 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 30-32). What is the function of the double? As Deleuze 
explains in Proust and Signs, it provides a new system of subjectivity of a doubled or 
split subject where instead of having a narrator, which functions as a subject, you 
have a machine that aims to becomes collective as it forges different connections to 
the outside (Deleuze 2008: 117; Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 18).  
 
Third, what is interesting about the letters is that the subject of the statement 
attempts to achieve exactly what the subject of enunciation is trying to avoid Ð the 
conjugal contract. Kafka will create a map of the obstacles that the subject of the 
statement will attempt to remove, while at the same time, the subject of enunciation 
is bringing about these obstacles. One might be tempted to ask who is guilty in this 
situation? However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the letters postulate everyoneÕs 
innocence: the innocence of the subject of enunciation that has done nothing; the 
innocence of the subject of the statement that has done everything, that has 
ventured Ôforth in the letters, attempting valiantly but in vain to overcome the 
obstacles to physical encountersÕ (Bogue 2003: 76); and the innocence of the 
addressee. According to Deleuze and Guattari, this creates both a torturous and a 
humorous situation (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 31-32). KafkaÕs humour, as Porter 
explains, is intimately connected to his politics (Porter 2009: 17; 20). Instead of an 
apolitical, and psychoanalytical or neurotic reading of Kafka - where guilt is assigned 
to the father; Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka is a comic and political writer 
whose letters provide a critique of the interiority of guilt through a critique of 
conjugality and Oedipus and the family (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 9, 32, 95).  
 
This criticism is made through a comic amplification or comic enlargement (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986: 10; 14), where Oedipus is Ôenlarged to the point of absurdityÕ 
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(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 10). This means the image of the father is projected 
into the whole world, showing aspects of the father that were not visible before 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 20). Therefore, the first consequence of comic 
amplification is the discovery that behind the familial triangle Ð made up of the 
father, the mother, and the child Ð there are other triangles at work; the family is 
subjected to outside powers for example of the economy or the state (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986: 11; 17). As Porter explains, the consequence of this is that the 
Oedipal figure is Ôrevealed as product of a certain combat or regime of power.Õ 
Therefore, before Oedipus and the Oedipus complex, there is power and the 
capitalist state apparatus (Porter, 2009: 21). This is the argument Deleuze and 
Guattari develop in Anti-Oedipus, where they claim Oedipal psychoanalysis 
supports the reproduction of capitalism by reinforcing capitalist subjectivity (Holland 
2012: 318). The second aspect of comic amplification is that by exposing the other 
triangles that are connected to the familial triangle, a possible line of escape 
appears (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 12). This line of escape is not about achieving 
absolute freedom, but about finding a path where there did not seem to be one 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 10; 13).  
 
However, the letters will ultimately be unable to provide a line of escape and they 
will entrap the author (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 34). There are three reasons for 
this. First, the doubling of the subject is not enough to get rid of subjectivity 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 30). Second, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, the 
postulation of everyone as innocent is the worst accusation because it shows a 
submission to outside powers creating an impasse (Deleuze and Guattari 1946: 11). 
Third, in the letters there is a re-Oedipalization, not by a return of guilt but by 
fatigue and by an outside judgement or a trial by the family, friends or a tribunal 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1946: 33). Nonetheless, even though the letters remain 
insufficient, Deleuze and Guattari argue they are indispensable for KafkaÕs literary 
machine. The letters help set the machine in motion. In Deleuze and GuattariÕs 
words ÔThe elements of the literary machine are already in these letters, even if they 




Now we can turn to the second component of KafkaÕs writing machine: the stories. 
As already mentioned, the letters set in motion the machine, but they were not 
enough to find a line of escape. In the stories, on the other hand, the animal will 
attempt to find this line of escape that was missing or unsuccessful in the letters 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 34-35). For example, in The Metamorphosis, GregorÕs 
becomes-animal in order to find a line of escape away from the familial triangle and 
! 66 
the bureaucratic and commercial triangle (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 14). What 
does becoming-animal entail? First of all, as Deleuze and Guattari explain Ôthere is 
nothing metaphoric about the becoming-animal. No symbolism, no allegoryÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 35), and no imitation (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 13-
14). Instead, as Bogue explains, becoming-animal can be understood as a process 
of becoming-other, which gives people an opportunity to move away from human 
codes by interacting with animals (Bogue 2007: 158). However, this only shows one 
side of the process. Deleuze and Guattari argue there is a double process of 
deterritorialization, a simultaneous becoming-animal of the human and a becoming-
human of the animal (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 14; 35). In order to clarify this 
double process of deterritorialization, we can turn to Deleuze and GuattariÕs most 
famous example of this process: the relationship between the orchid and the wasp. 
On one side, the orchid becomes deterritorialized by creating an image of a female 
wasp, which attracts a male wasp that is reterritorialized in this image. On the other 
side, the wasp becomes deterritorialized by becoming part of the orchidÕs 
reproductive apparatus, reterritorializing the orchid by transporting its pollen 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 10; Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 2; Adkins 2015: 28). This 
can be understood as a double process of becoming (Holland, 2013: 39), where 
there is a simultaneous wasp-becoming of the orchid, as a sexual organ of the wasp; 
and an orchid-becoming of the wasp, as part of the reproductive apparatus of the 
orchid (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 2).  
 
Nonetheless, Deleuze and Guattari argue the animal stories indicate a line of escape 
that the animal is ultimately unable to follow (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 37). The 
stories remain insufficient for two reasons. First, although becoming-animal allows 
Kafka to overcome the duality of the letters, moving away from subjectivity; Deleuze 
and Guattari argue the animal still plays the role of a collective subject (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986: 15, 36, 84). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words Ôthe animal was still to 
close, still to perceptible, too visible, too individuatedÉÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986: 37). Second, the stories will either close on themselves in order to be finished; 
or they will open up to the point of being interminable (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 
36). In this sense, the letters show us a way into the assemblage, without actually 




It is not until the novels that a more complex and functioning assemblage is 
developed (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 37). As Bogue explains, in the novels Kafka 
is finally able to maintain the movement that keeps the writing machine functioning 
(for this reason the novels always remain unfinished) (Bogue 2003: 4). However two 
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questions remain: what is the difference between the stories, the novels, and the 
letters? What makes the novels work? The difference between the letters, the stories 
and the novels is that they each form a different type of machine. First we have the 
machinic index of the letters, where you can appreciate individual pieces that are 
sign of an assemblage, but we do not know how they function together yet (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1986: 47). Second, we have the abstract machines of the stories, which 
remain transcendental, thus they are unable to develop in a concrete way and 
connect to other assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 47-48). Third, we have 
the assemblage of the machine in the novels, where we move from machinic 
indexes or abstract machines, into real self-sufficient assemblages (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986: 48). This means that in order for the machine to develop, it needs to 
connect into concrete political and social assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 38; 
39). In other words, in the novels the lines of escape are finally Ôconnected into 
specific circuitsÕ (Bogue 2003: 78); that go across the personal, familial and socio-
political domains (Bogue 2003: 192). In the novels, Kafka is finally able to get rid of 
the subject, the subject becomes a Ôgeneral functionÕ that is connected to series and 
proliferates. In this sense, as already mentioned, the individual is not opposed to the 
general, but connected to it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 84). In Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs words, K, in The Trial, functions as Ôa polyvalent assemblage of which the 
solitary individual is only a part, the coming collectivity being another part, another 
piece of the machineÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 85). 
 
In the novels we can fully appreciate the critical power of KafkaÕs literary machine, 
which was present in the letters and the stories, but was still insufficient. However, 
before discussing the critical power of the literary machine it is important to make a 
note on the relationship between the letters, the stories and the novels. Deleuze 
and Guattari argue there is a constant communication, in different directions, 
between these three components of the literary machine. In this sense the lived 
experience of the letters is as connected to the written experience, as the written 
experience is connected to the lived experience; there is no primacy of one over the 
other (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 40).   
 
Going back to the critical power of the literary machine, which is fully developed in 
the novels Deleuze and Guattari argue there are two simultaneous functions of 
writing: first, to convert everything into assemblages; and second, to dismantle 
these assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 47). As Porter emphasizes, Deleuze 
and Guattari are arguing that translating everything into assemblages, and 
dismantling these assemblages, are part of the same task (Porter 2009: 27). The 
question is, how exactly are translation and dismantling connected? Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs example in Kafka is his dismantling of three particular aspects of the law: 
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Ôthe transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, and subjectivity of enunciationÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45). We can start by looking at the critique of the 
transcendence of the law. According to Deleuze and GuattariÕs reading, in 
opposition to the transcendent understanding of the law, where there is a pre-
existent conception of the Good, Kafka portrays the law as having no content and 
no object. There are two consequences of this, first the law is unknowable and 
ambiguous, and thus it can only be justified with reference to its practical necessity. 
Second, the law only functions through its expression in a sentence, Ôit is the 
statement, the enunciation, that constructs the law in the name of an immanent 
power of the one who enounces itÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45); this statement 
is then attributed to a body through punishment (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 43-45). 
In other words, the law is conceived as the effect of an action, rather than as an end 
in itself (Colebrook 2002: 310). The second aspect of the law that is dismantled is 
guilt, according to Deleuze and Guattari Kafka replaces the Oedipal theme of guilt 
with fear, escape and dismantling. Thus, the letters are driven by a fear of 
entrapment instead of by guilt, the animal stories are driven by the need of finding a 
line of escape, and the novels are driven by an attempt to dismantle the assemblage 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 46). Finally, as already mentioned according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, KafkaÕs literary machine is driven by an attempt to move away from the 
subject. However, it is not until the novels where statements are not attributed to a 
particular subject of enunciation, but to a collective assemblage of enunciation 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 84). 
 
As Bogue summarizes, through the transcription and dismantling of assemblages, 
Kafka modifies familiar codes and institutions: ÔKafka defamiliarizes the law by 
depriving it of its conventional, commonsense logicÕ (Bogue 2003: 80). Therefore, as 
the example of KafkaÕs dismantling of the law demonstrates, the function of KafkaÕs 
literary machine is not to represent the world, but to transform it; Kafka is first and 
foremost a political author. KafkaÕs literary machine is infused with a critical power 
that directly intervenes in the real. However, it is important to clarify what it is meant 
by critical, as Deleuze and Guattari claim that Ôthere is never any social criticism in 
KafkaÕ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 46). How can Kafka be conceived as a political 
writer and not a critical writer? As explained by Porter, in Kafka, Deleuze and 
Guattari provide a critique of Ôany image of critique grounded solely or simply in 
representationÕ (Porter 2009: 39). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs words, Ôthe method of 
active dismantling doesnÕt make use of criticism that is still part of representationÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 48). Instead of representation, critique can be 
understood as experimentation, an attempt to connect to the virtual (but not less 




Given a summary of the project was already provided in the introduction. The aim of 
the conclusion is to provide a reformulation of the project of immanent critique, 
through DeleuzeÕs transcendental empiricism, in order to highlight the critical aspect 
of DeleuzeÕs project. The importance of transcendental empiricism lays in the fact 
that it provides a critical philosophy a way of going beyond the representation of 
the world into that which constitutes it, opening up the possibilities of 
transformation. As Bryant explains, transcendental empiricism can be understood as 
Ôthe philosophical position which determines the conditions of the real rather than 
possible experienceÕ (Bryant 2008: 3). This represents a move away from KantÕs 
transcendental idealism, which posited a sharp distinction between things as they 
appear to us (phenomena), and things in themselves (noumena) (Stang 2016); which 
led to the conditions for the possibility of knowledge being limited to phenomena 
through the subject (Bergen 2009: 7-8). However, according to Deleuze, the 
problem with Kant is that the condition (the subjectÕs consciousness) ends up 
replicating the image of the conditioned (experience) in a vicious circle (Deleuze 
1990: 105; Bryant 2008: 31). In BryantÕs words: Ôthe conditions are supposed to 
account for the possibility of truth within experience, yet the conditions themselves 
get their justification insofar as experience is taken to be trueÕ (Bryant 2008: 32). In 
opposition to this Deleuze, following Maimon, aims to establish the genetic 
conditions of real experience through a principle of difference (Smith and Protevi 
2015). Breaking away from the Kantian dualism between phenomenon and 
noumenon (Bergen 2009: 8). As explained in chapter two, according to Deleuze, 
Nietzsche satisfied these two exigencies with genealogy as a genetic method and 
the will to power as a principle of difference (Smith and Protevi 2015). 
 
Following Bergson, the problem of noumena and phenomena, or the transcendental 
and the empirical, can also be articulated in terms of the virtual and the actual 
(Bergen 2009: 8). As already mentioned, in contrast to Kant, for Deleuze the 
conditions cannot resemble the conditioned (Smith and Protevi 2015). Therefore, 
while the actual refers to the state of affairs and individuals (Boundas 2005: 296), the 
virtual refers to a pure transcendental field made up of pure or intensive differences 
(Bergen 2009: 8). In other words, while the actual refers to our experience of the 
world and the identities that conform it, the virtual is the ground for those identities 
and it is therefore purely differential (Smith and Protevi 2015). What does it mean to 
be purely differential? As explained by Williams, one of DeleuzeÕs aims in Difference 
and Repetition is to think difference in itself, beyond identity and representation, for 
example as in the case of Ôthe difference between two thingsÕ (Williams 2003: 55). 
The problem of these approaches to difference is that they presume the identity of 
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related things, which leads to the abolishing difference (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 
60). Therefore, when Deleuze talks about intensive relations or relations of pure 
difference he is referring to internal difference or the difference of ÔBeing from itselfÕ 
as opposed to Ôexternal difference between beingsÕ Ð providing a mobile picture of 
the world (Smith 2012: 41).  
 
How can we understand the relationship between the virtual and the actual? As 
Clisby and Bowden explain, there are two main interpretations of the relationship 
between the virtual and the actual. On one side, we have commentators such as 
Badiou (2000) and Hallward (2006) who grant ontological priority to the virtual over 
the actual (Clisby and Bowden 2017: 153). The consequence of this interpretation is 
the portrayal of Deleuze as a mystic or spiritual thinker who is Ôindifferent to the 
politics of this worldÕ (Hallward 2006: 162).  In contrast to this, other authors such as 
Smith (2012) and Williams (2003) understand the relationship between the virtual 
and the actual as one of ontological influence (Clisby and Bowden 2017: 153). As 
Boundas suggests, this interpretation can be portrayed in the following diagram: 
virtual/real ßà actual/real ßà virtual/real (Boundas 2005: 297). As this diagram 
shows, not only we can access the actual through the virtual, we can also access the 
virtual through the actual (Mackenzie and Porter 2011: 64). In other words, although 
the virtual is actualized in a given state of affairs, we can also move from the actual 
state of affairs, through its virtual potential, into its actualization in a new state of 
affairs (Boundas 2005: 297). Second, the diagram shows how for Deleuze both the 
actual and the virtual are real. As MacKenzie and porter explain, the difference 
between the virtual and the actual is that the virtual is made up of relations of pure 
differences that are indeterminate: Ôthey have a role in determining individuals but 
cannot in themselves be determined.Õ However, the virtual is still real in the sense 
that it is a component of actual determinable things (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 
61).  
 
As MacKenzie and Porter show us, the advantage of this interpretation is that it is 
compatible with a reading of Deleuze philosophy as a critical philosophy, which 
provides us tools for the transformation of the world (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 
65). How is this the case? As Smith explains, if Ôthe virtual and the actual are related 
to one another and entail changes in one anotherÕ (Smith 2003: 198), then it follows 
that you can access the virtual through changing the actual (MacKenzie and Porter 
2011: 64). To be more precise, the only way of accessing the virtual is through 
experimentation with the actual, since the virtual is not identifiable as an object of 
knowledge (Smith 2003: 197). Therefore, as argued by MacKenzie and Porter (2011) 
DeleuzeÕs philosophy can be understood as part of a lineage of critical methods 
inspired by MarxÕs thesis 11 on Feuerbach Ôphilosophers have only interpreted the 
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world, in various ways, the point is to change itÕ (McLellan 2000: 173). Broadly 
speaking, the main point uniting this lineage of critical methods is that Ôknowledge 
regarding the social and political worldÉ will only emerge in the process of 
transforming society and politicsÕ (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 65).  
 
Before finalizing, it is important to acknowledge the last challenge that was faced 
when putting the different sections of this project together. While the problem of 
immanence was present quite explicitly throughout the thesis, this was not the case 
for the problems of critique and politics; or at least not as explicitly. It seems to be 
the case, that when we concentrate on the immanent philosophical side of the 
problem of an immanent critique, we tend to loose sight of critique and of politics. 
Therefore, one question still remains: how do we develop an account of the 
philosophical conditions of critique without losing track of politics and critique itself? 
Additionally, there is a similar question that I have been struggling with as the end 
of this project approached, while attempting to develop a PhD proposal: how do we 
develop an account of the philosophical conditions of resistance without loosing 
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